

Why Norway?



HENNION

by Fridtjof

HUTCHINSON

1/-

A FIGHT FOR FREEDOM PUBLICATION

THE writer's investigation led to the confirmation of the general German attitude.

Whoever is in the way—peaceful and peace-loving—friend of the German people or not—has to be crushed.

Norway was a country governed by Socialists. It offered friendship and help to everybody who needed it.

It did not escape aggression by the Germans. The writer, a Socialist, had to recognize it.

“FIGHT FOR FREEDOM”

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WHY NORWAY?

A Contribution to the History of Germany's
Aggression against the North

by

FRIDTJOF

With a Preface by Dr. Arne Ordning

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To the Brave Teachers of Norway
 who refused to teach the youth entrusted
 to their care to desecrate liberty, justice
 and humanity, and rather suffered
 banishment and forced labour.

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PREFACE

NORWAY was one of the most peaceable countries in the world. Our people had enjoyed an unbroken period of peace for 125 years. Our Union with Sweden was ended by friendly agreement, and from the day our national independence was established our Government followed a policy of strict neutrality. We had no colonies, we were troubled with no minority problems, and we had no border disputes with any other country. Through their own industry alone our people had attained a high standard of living, and built up a sound system of social and political democracy. The great hero of our youth was not a military leader or conqueror, but a civilian, the great explorer and sportsman Fridtjof Nansen, who gained world fame by his daring expeditions into the Arctic regions, and by his great humanitarian efforts in the first difficult years after the last great war when his work was instrumental in saving the lives of millions of people.

On April 9, 1940, our tranquil and lovely country was suddenly attacked by a ruthless and pitiless foe. Unprepared, our people took up the fight against overwhelming odds, and suffered all the horrors of war. The heavily armed and well-prepared enemy conquered our defenceless country, but he was not satisfied with his military success: Norway was to be "incorporated" into Germany's *Lebensraum*, and the Norwegian people were to adopt the Nazi creed. But our unarmed people refused to be moved either by threats or cajolery, and they held fast to their own Constitution, to their own ideals and to their own faith, until even the *Herrenvolk* were grudgingly compelled to recognize that our "contemptible democracy" possessed spiritual and moral reserves beyond their comprehension. Germany's answer to our people's resistance was the institution of a reign of terror. The regime of oppression and persecution is much the same in all countries occupied by the Germans, and its ruthless cruelty is hardly realized by those who have not suffered it at first hand. Unfortunately, it must not be thought that this cruelty is the work of a few sadistic individuals. No, the instrument of terror is wielded deliberately and in cold blood as an essential part of the Nazi system.

Today all Norwegians are asking themselves two questions: Why was our country attacked? And how can we prevent a repetition of that attack in the future? In this pamphlet Fridtjof provides us with a detailed answer to the first question, and he shows us clearly that Germany invaded our country because she needed our raw materials and the use of our harbours in her struggle with Great Britain. He also shows that Germany's policy towards us and towards the other Scandinavian countries is no new thing, and what he says in this respect merits particular attention. Basing his exposition on a number of important but lesser-known docu-

ments, he shows us that Germany's policy has proceeded in one unbroken line from Bismarck to Hitler. In Scandinavia, as elsewhere, Nazi policy is merely the continuation of Pan-Germanism and Prussian militarism.

Norway was spared invasion during the First World War, but, as Fridtjof shows us, this was not due to any squeamishness on Germany's part with regard to our neutrality, but rather because the Kaiser was not prepared to let his fleet try decisive conclusions with the British Navy. The result was that the greater part of Germany's fleet was locked up in Kiel and in the Bight of Heligoland throughout the war. Even at the time this cautious policy was sharply criticized by prominent German naval strategists, who declared that by a *coup de main* the German fleet should seize control of the Danish and Norwegian coasts. The Norwegian coast would then represent Germany's right flank in the Battle of the Atlantic instead of Great Britain's left, whilst with bases in our harbours Germany's surface craft could break the line of Great Britain's blockade, which stretched from the Shetland Islands to Bergen. Under the Weimar Republic this view secured general recognition amongst Germany's naval strategists, who were determined that in their sphere as everywhere else there should be no repetition of the errors which had led to Germany's defeat in the First World War. This naval strategy was in accordance with the "dynamic" theories of Nazism and corresponded with the *Blitzkrieg* tactics planned for the war on land.

We do not know when the material preparations for the conquest of Norway were first instituted, but we do know that the plans for the invasion were long in readiness, while Blomberg's visit to Norway in 1936 shows that even then Germany's preparations were far advanced. Of course, it was no secret to Norway, Great Britain and France that Germany desired control of the Norwegian coast, but the experts felt that any conquest of Norway from the sea was impossible as long as the British Navy was master of the North Sea and the Skagerrak. But what we failed to realize in Norway was that the development of the air arm had fundamentally changed the strategic position of our country. The operations of surface craft in narrow waters close to enemy air bases had become a matter of extraordinary difficulty, and it was therefore impossible for Great Britain to maintain close control of the Skagerrak. During the Norwegian campaign British submarines and Norwegian coastal batteries sank a number of German ships, but they were unable to prevent the Germans from pouring hundreds of thousands of troops into the country. In consequence the upshot of the Norwegian campaign was a foregone conclusion.

Many Norwegians firmly believed that the German Government would shrink from such an inexcusable invasion of a peaceable country with whom Germany had no quarrel whatever, if only on account of the effect such a crime would have on the rest of the

world. However, this belief proved to be a naive illusion. The Germans were prepared to stop at nothing, and they did not hesitate to strike down what they termed "a Germanic sister nation" as soon as it suited their book. The great majority of the German people were poisoned by militarist and Nazi propaganda, and were firmly persuaded that they had the right of the stronger to subjugate and enslave weaker nations.

Fridtjof's booklet makes all this very clear. The Norwegian people now realize it themselves, and they realize, too, that their future will be determined largely by their own contribution to it. Today they are proud of the fact that though they are a numerically small nation they are nevertheless taking an active part in the struggle of the United Nations against Nazi-German aggression. The biggest contribution which Norway has been in a position to make to the common cause has been her mercantile marine, which holds fourth place amongst the nations of the world, and is perhaps the most modern of them all. Up to the present the Norwegian home front has had to fight against the invader without arms, but we all hope that the day is not far removed when we shall be able to stand face to face with him and answer blow for blow. The best foundation for international co-operation after the war will be that solidarity which has been created amongst the United Nations by their comradeship in arms. Today the Norwegian people are fully aware that the days of neutrality and isolation are gone, and that in the future all nations, both great and small, will have to stand together.

Between 1914 and 1940 Norway took a willing share in Scandinavian co-operation, but it was mainly of a social and cultural nature, and at no time did it develop into close political relations. There are many points of similarity in the domestic conditions of the Scandinavian countries, but strategically their positions are very different. That undeniable fact has had a decisive effect on our history, and it has been demonstrated again in the present war. Strategically considered, Finland is entirely a Baltic State, and her foreign policy has been determined by her hostility to Russia, which has led her into this war on Germany's side. Strategically Sweden faces both the Atlantic and the Baltic, but for the greater part of her history she, too, has been a Baltic Power. Formerly the sympathies of the Swedish people were divided between Germany and her opponents; today the great majority hope for a victory of the United Nations over Germany. This change is due in no small measure to what has happened in Norway. However, Sweden is still able to maintain a precarious neutrality. Denmark is occupied by the Germans. The Danish people are almost wholly sympathetic to the cause of the United Nations, but strategically and militarily Denmark was under Germany's thumb, and the Danish Government considered it hopeless to offer any resistance to the invaders. On the other hand, the position of Norway is clear.

She is an Atlantic country, and both her interests and her sympathies are in the camp of the United Nations. The country is occupied by the Germans, but its people consider themselves in a state of war with Germany.

In the future Norway will continue to co-operate with the other Scandinavian countries, but she has learnt a very valuable lesson—namely, that a small nation can hope to preserve its national integrity against the attack of an aggressive Great Power only if it co-operates with other Great Powers. Therefore we look forward in the future to maintaining the closest relations with our Allies. But first Nazi Germany must be utterly destroyed. Then we must see to it by every means in our power that no new imperialism is built up in the place of Nazidom. After this war our people will demand military security against any further aggression. Our main problem will be the defence of our long coastline, and to secure this we shall look to co-operation with the other Atlantic powers, to Great Britain and the United States, to Canada, Iceland, Holland, Belgium and France. It is desirable, too, that Denmark and Sweden should join in such a system. They are both countries with the same ideals and the same strategic aims as ourselves. Unfortunately our Allies now have good reason to know what it means when German submarines and German aeroplanes can operate from Norwegian harbours and Norwegian airfields. Above all, it threatens their lines of communication to the Soviet Union.

After the war Norway will work zealously to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. For several hundreds of years Norway's relations with Russia have been peaceable, and today the Norwegian people are filled with admiration for the heroic resistance of the Russian people against the inroads of the German war machine. Close co-operation based upon mutual confidence between the Democracies of Western Europe and the Soviet Union will be the best possible guarantee for Norway's security, and also the best basis for the erection of a new League of free Nations.

Regional agreements cannot be considered as history's last word. Our ultimate goal must be the establishment of an international organization based upon law, and secure in the power to implement its decisions. However, we must recognize that it will be a long time before the nations of the world will be ready to abandon their national sovereignty and surrender their individual rights in favour of world government. Nevertheless, Norway will work untiringly in this direction. The world's economic and social problems cannot be solved satisfactorily within national boundaries, and Norway will therefore zealously support all efforts to bring about effective international co-operation in the economic and social sphere as well.

Like all people under the German yoke, the Norwegian people are involved in a deadly struggle against overwhelming odds, which

calls for the utmost concentration even to maintain it from one day to the next. They have only one thought: this war must be won. They know at first hand what German rule means, and only those who have experienced it in this way can really know. All their hopes are centred on the armies of the free world, on the statesmen of the free nations. When this war is over they will have the same demand, but differently formulated. It must never happen again—the peace must also be won.

History has made the Norwegian people extremely conscious of their nationality. In the past they have always achieved their national aspirations by peaceable means, by a bloodless struggle based on the justice of their cause, rather than by force or the threat of force. Their own national struggle has made them keenly interested in international problems and in the struggles of other peoples against injustice. But up to April 9, 1940, they believed that a people's will to justice, peace and international fraternity was in itself a protection against attack, and that he who knew he was right would be victorious in the end, as our experiences had been throughout our own history.

This war has taught us, like all others, costly lessons. The democratic and humanitarian tradition represented after the last war by Fridtjof Nansen will live on. But today we know that it is not enough to demonstrate our sense of justice in international co-operation and our sympathy and solidarity with other people who are suffering. In addition, our military and foreign policy must seek to obtain solid and practical guarantees that what has happened during the last few years shall never happen again.

London,
September, 1942.

ARNE ORDING.

INTRODUCTION

WHY us? Why Norway? That was the bewildered question the author could read on the startled and astonished faces of the people of Norway. It lay unspoken on their lips, and looked out of eyes dilated with horror at witnessing the sudden end of the peaceful world in which they had lived so securely.

That was on the morning of April 9, 1940. In the night the Germans had brought the horrors of war to the quiet fiords and peaceful countryside of Norway.

Work in the town at the end of the Drammensfiord had stopped. The inhabitants stood on the streets in groups, collected in crowds in the market-place, and clustered on the great new bridge looking out on the wide fiord enclosed by its ranges of tranquil mountains. Hardly twenty miles downstream to where all eyes were directed, fighting had taken place in the early hours of the morning when the Germans attempted to force an entry into the upper part of the Oslofiord.

The people of Norway harboured no feelings of enmity towards Germany. Norway had no grudge against Germany, and not even Germany had expressed any grievances against Norway. And yet the Germans had brought war to Norway, without warning and without a formal declaration. A German diplomat, one of the closest collaborators of the German Ambassador in Oslo, had himself appeared in uniform to lead a detachment of German troops against the Norwegian Royal Family and against the members of the Norwegian Government to prevent their escape and take them dead or alive. German bombers had already laid a score of towns in ruins, and the women of Nybergsund, Aandalsnes, Molde, Kristiansund, Namsos, Steinkjaer, Narvik, Bodoe and other towns were red-eyed with weeping.

Prussian-Germany, which had fallen on Denmark in 1848 and again in 1863, attacked her "sister nation" Austria in 1866, waged war on France in 1870, plunged the whole of Europe into war in 1914, and the whole world into war in 1939, had now descended on one of the most peaceable peoples in the world and destroyed its freedom and independence.

Again and again in history Germany's unbounded lust for aggrandizement and power caused her to trample on international law, violate the sovereign rights of other peoples and devastate their peaceful lands. Her deliberate determination to do all these monstrous things has been expressed with brutal frankness by a German Professor, Werner Sombart: "We are determined to be strong, to build up a powerful German State, and to keep it

powerful, and therefore to see it grow according to organic laws. Should more land be necessary to permit our larger national being to develop freely, then we shall take as much land as we think right. We shall also set our foot firmly wherever strategic considerations make it seem necessary for the maintenance of our inviolate strength. That is all."

That was all! Strategic considerations made it seem necessary—and the national life and happiness of a whole people were wiped out.

Whilst Germany's lust for power and expansion was being so shamelessly proclaimed, another writer, a gentle poet, was speaking of Germany too:

"Despite all the talk of individual goodness and badness amongst Englishmen, Frenchmen and Germans, it remains true that now in time of war each separate country is personified for us. We see the soul of each nation as an individual.

"I try to recall my impression of Germany when she seemed pleasing and good: landscape or towns whose beauty had something of an old miniature in them or a mood invoked by beautiful children's stories. I recall faces from a gallery of the past whose beauty lay in their tranquillity. I recall little verses whose unforced simplicity evokes feelings of tenderness. All of these things that took my thoughts to Snow White as she lay so still in her coffin of glass hidden away in the depths of Germany's forests. And then—a sudden movement, a violent gesture, an outburst of feeling, and everything was made ugly, the beautiful movements of limbs and the tender evocation of thought. . . .

"It seems unthinkable to me that the German people will ever willingly forsake their militarism, no matter what it may cost. Not that the German people need militarism like the crab needs its shell, a hard external armour to protect a soft, boneless body. But strict Prussian discipline and mechanical Prussian administration are certainly vitally necessary to Pan-Germany—they form the hard shell which gives strength and power of movement to a people whose inner make-up is soft and flabby.

"But, for all that, it is not envy or rancour or even primarily fear which moves those who are filled with dismay at the sight of Germany's efficiency. It is an instinctive espousal of the cause of mankind, whose strength comes from the spine within the soft and sensitive flesh it shows to the outside world, against the fearful claws of the hard-shelled creature which menaces it.

"One has only to think of Germany's postage stamps: there is Germania with a spiked helmet on her head and spiked

breastplates—even the source of mother-milk is sealed. And then one turns to the sower of the French stamp—yes, she is a good symbol for the soul of France. One cannot maintain 'neutrality in one's heart' when one knows she is engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the ugly picture evoked by Germany's 'Victory Column', the picture of a world encased in a hard Prussian shell and taught to move automatically in an uncouth and ungainly fashion."

These are the sensitive lines of Sigrid Undset, the Norwegian poetess and holder of the Nobel Prize for Literature. Sigrid Undset has lost one of her two sons in the slaughter loosed by the Germans against her people, and her treasured home has been destroyed. The author met her on an adventurous flight. She came from burning towns, a hail of bombs, and the rapid splutter of machine-guns, and she was weary, unutterably weary.

Today she is in the forefront of the struggle against the triumph of might and against the violation of freedom, justice and humanity by Germany.

I. THE HANSEATIC WAR ON NORWAY

1. INVASION 600 YEARS AGO.

The frontiers of Norway have not changed very much throughout the centuries. They were more or less created by Nature herself. Natural conditions, too, have made the Norwegian people, moulded their character and determined their way of life. The innate democratic character of the whole people, which expresses itself so clearly in their system of administration, their deep-rooted devotion to the cause of freedom, and their unwavering love of justice—all have their origin in these natural conditions.

The Norwegian people are not warlike, and they have no desire to be. Whilst the Germans boastfully recall the robber crusades and tribal violence of their ancestors the old Teutons, the Norwegian people soberly teach their children that the basis of cultural process and material well-being in Norway was not laid by the more dramatic activities of the small bands of Vikings, but by the long and less spectacular work of many generations of peace-loving men who tilled the soil and delved for ore and metals.

When Norway first suffered the violence of her German neighbours her economic system was largely based on peasant farming, and the national unity of her people was not fully established, because the sparse distribution of her population over wide and often not easily accessible territories made the process of national welding a slow one. The power of the kingship was limited, and it was often undermined by dynastic and tribal disputes.

At this time the so-called Holy Roman Empire of the German nation was in process of rapid dissolution. New social forces were springing up and fighting to remould society according to their own political interests. Great mercantile centres were growing rapidly on the Baltic and the North Sea: Hamburg, Luebeck, Bremen, Stralsund, Rostock and Greifswald. They were the gateways of commerce, and Germany's trade with the outside world passed through them. Mutual interest brought these towns together and fashioned their rapidly growing power into the great Hanseatic League. National limits soon became too small for Hanseatic merchant capital, and they were burst asunder. The lust for power and profit incited the Hanseatic merchants to attack the commerce of other nations, and before long they had driven Norwegian seamen from the shipping roads to England and to Flanders, and imposed a stranglehold on Norway's trade and shipping.

The ships of the Hanseatic League put into Norwegian harbours, bringing not only merchandise but men. Increasing numbers of Germans, many of them honest artisans, but many more soldiers of fortune, cut-throats and swashbucklers, followed the Hansa merchants. Soon there were colonies of Germans in Oslo, Bergen and other Norwegian trading centres, and they behaved themselves like conquerors, bullying their way by force and fraud into a monopolist position in Norway's trade and commerce. Norway's kings and Norway's towns did their best to re-establish freedom of trading, but the powerful Hanseatic merchants made such effective use of their advantage that they were soon playing the role of "Protectors", and no legislation was possible without their consent.

In 1278 King Magnus of Norway was compelled to issue a charter to the Hanseatic League setting out its privileges in detail. Norwegian law was altered in favour of foreign commercial interests. Not that the Germans were fully satisfied even then, though the charter gave the merchants of the Hanseatic League privileges over all their competitors and even over Norway's own merchants.

2. A REIGN OF HANSEATIC VIOLENCE.

The chartered rights extorted from the Norwegians by the threat of violence were used by the Hanseatic merchants to force the granting of still further concessions and as a basis for the raising of still further demands. The Emperor, the North-German Princes and the Hanseatic cities, though at loggerheads in all matters relating to the German Reich, were at one in attacking a weaker opponent and increasing their own power and influence at his expense. They organized a joint assault on Norway, sent out privateers to raid Norwegian shipping, and threatened to establish a complete blockade of Norway's harbours unless the King and the Norwegian towns capitulated and accepted the dictates of the Hanseatic League.

The German locust has not changed much throughout the

centuries. In the second half of the fourteenth century a further attempt was made by the Norwegians to curtail the privileges extorted from them by the Hanseatic League, but the League was then at the height of its power and influence, and the attempt failed. In November 1367 a league for the struggle against the Kings of Norway and Denmark was solemnly founded in the Hansa Chamber of the Cologne Rathaus and fifty-seven German towns joined it. Shortly afterwards the German Princes subscribed to it, and a joint plan of campaign was worked out. A conference of the Hanseatic League in Stralsund decided to supplement naval and military operations by a prohibition of all trading with Norway.

Hostilities lasted three years, and when peace was finally concluded the treaty consolidated the power and privileges of the German Hanseatic imperialists in Norway and Denmark. New privileges were added to the old, and the whole was pronounced with the hypocrisy which still sounds so familiar to be "in the interests of the freedom of the seas". Writing six hundred years later a Teutonic admirer of the Hanseatic robbers declared: "Thus not only was the economic influence of the Hanseatic League consolidated over the Scandinavian and Baltic North, but its political position was made secure in a fashion which proves more convincingly than any other evidence how strongly the German Hanseatic fist could grip even when it reached out overseas."

In 1367 the Archbishop of Trondhjem was moved to address a letter to the representatives of the Hanseatic League in Bergen begging them and their sailors to keep the peace with the Norwegian people, and not to treat them as outcasts and riff-raff. A few years later the Ambassador of King Haakon VI of Norway brought a message from his master to the Hanseatic Conference in Luebeck charging the Hanseatic merchants in Norway with persistent violation of the existing agreements. They appointed their own judges and refused to recognize the law of the land. They perverted justice in their own interests. They treated the law and the behests of justice with contempt and scandalized the Norwegian people and their deep-rooted respect for law and devotion to justice. The armed followers of the Hanseatic merchants murdered Norwegians and foreign visitors to Norway, and the murderers were withdrawn from the writ of Norwegian justice. Violence was used to compel the Norwegians to deliver up all the German merchants desired of them. Their houses were broken into, their goods carried off, and their farms pillaged.

It was a long list of injustices done to his people that the King of Norway presented to the gentlemen of Prussia for consideration by their Christian consciences, but it was no prompting of their consciences that finally brought the outrages to an end, and it was not until the fifteenth century that freedom of maritime trading was finally obtained by Norway in the North Sea and the Baltic secure from the depredations of Hanseatic pirates.

It is typical of German historical writing, and, indeed, typical of Germany's mental attitude altogether, that the period of the Hanseatic League is regarded as a brilliant and splendid page in Germany's history, and that there is nothing but loud praise in Germany's history books for the piracy committed against Norway's ships, for the war waged brutally against Norway's towns, for the ravaging of the Norwegian countryside, and for the establishment of a regime of brute force against a peaceable, small people.

II. IN THE SHADOW OF GERMAN POWER POLITICS

1. TWICE ON THE THRESHOLD OF WAR.

It was more than a mere coincidence of history that the end of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation was followed by war and aggression on Germany's part against Norway and the two other Scandinavian countries, and that the preparations for the foundation of the second German Empire were preceded by wars against the North. This second time, however, Norway was not the direct object of German aggression. Denmark was the chosen victim.

The introductory moves prior to the establishment of German national unity were accompanied by attacks on non-German territory. The new German parliament formed in 1848 in Frankfurt-on-Main was little more than the plaything of the Prussian monarchy and the elements which supported it, and on April 12, 1848, it decided that the Danish province of Schleswig and the Duchy of Holstein, whose Duke was at the same time King of Denmark, should be brought into the German League, by armed force if necessary. The reactionary powers in Prussia and in the other League States welcomed this exhibition of aggressive nationalism on the part of a farcical parliament against a small nation. What could have suited them better than this patriotic distraction from domestic affairs? It was not long before the threatened war against Denmark was actually launched.

Only two weeks before the Frankfurt Parliament decided in favour of war, the Prussian Ambassador in Copenhagen had formally informed the Danish Government that his king "was moved only by a desire to contribute to a just and equitable solution of the Danish question". And replying to Lord Palmerston, who had caused the British Ambassador in Berlin to lodge a note of protest against the intended investment of Schleswig by German troops, the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs declared categorically: "The German League has no intention of disputing the possession of Schleswig with the Danish Crown."

Owing to the joint opposition of Great Britain, Russia, Norway, and Sweden it was not so easy to achieve the war aim of the Frankfurt

Parliament as the war-mongering German patriots had thought, and the Prussian-German forces had to evacuate the Danish territory they had occupied. This "national defeat" brought the Parliament into disrepute and led to nationalist excesses and the sending of Prussian troops to Frankfurt.

The defeat was formally sealed in 1850 by the signing of a treaty of peace between the German League and Denmark. But the defeat rankled, and for twelve years the Prussian-German reactionaries bided their time until a favourable opportunity arose of overthrowing the settlement. In 1861 Bismarck was ready to avenge his country's humiliation, and he caused the King of Prussia to deliver a challenging and provocative Speech from the Throne expressing his "lively regret" that the "two German Duchies" under the Danish Crown were not permitted to enjoy the constitutional rights to which they were entitled under the existing agreement, and announcing that he regarded it as a national duty on the part of Prussia and her German allies to secure an acceptable solution to the problem.

Bismarck was confident that Germany's power was much greater than it had been towards the end of the 'forties. He was anxious to stir up "national enthusiasm" to assist him to realize the far-reaching plans he had up his sleeve, plans which went much farther than a belated settlement of accounts with little Denmark. Writing in a private letter at the time, he declared: "It is quite certain that the whole Danish question can be settled to our satisfaction only by war. The occasion for war can be found as soon as the moment is considered favourable for the prosecution of hostilities. . . . If war does come, then the future of Danish territorial arrangements will depend on its outcome." Bismarck was intent on war under all circumstances. If the League Parliament were to reject the demand for a declaration of war against Denmark, then he planned that the two chief German Powers (Prussia and Austria) should act independently of the German League, and "attach" the Duchy of Schleswig. The Swedish-Norwegian Government did lodge a very vigorous protest, but Bismarck reckoned that Germany could satisfactorily deal with 20,000 Norwegians and Swedes, and so he brushed the protests to one side.

On Christmas Eve, 1863, Prussian troops invaded Holstein, and later Prussian and Austrian troops even entered Danish territory proper. To justify his crime Bismarck used the favourite German trick of placing the blame for the aggression on the victim of it, and he was shameless enough to declare: "Denmark is the aggressor." The diplomatic representative of Sweden and Norway rightly answered that such a charge "added insult to injury", and concluded his protest by declaring: "The world will judge."

Why did Germany launch two wars of aggression against this little Scandinavian State within the short space of fifteen years? It was done to establish Prussian-German hegemony in the North

Sea and the Baltic. It represented a threat to both Norway and Sweden, and the Norwegian Storting was not slow to recognize the significance of the power politics pursued by the growing German Reich. A Committee of the Storting declared: "We recognize that matters may develop to the point where Norway must intervene in the war between Germany and Denmark, but at the same time conditions must be such that this intervention, if it takes place, would really be of assistance to Denmark and not vitally endanger the safety of the Norwegian State."

The devotion of the Norwegian people to the cause of peace was so deep-rooted that not even the brutal war of annexation waged by Prussia against Denmark was sufficient to bring them into the war on Denmark's side. At the same time, political rivalries between the great European Powers prevented, as Bismarck had calculated, any successful intervention on their part in favour of Denmark such as had occurred in 1848-49, and Denmark was defeated. The war was, of course, allegedly waged "to free our German brothers from the Danish yoke". If any proof of the utter hypocrisy of this were needed Prussia provided it after the conclusion of peace, when Bismarck consistently sabotaged the provision whereby Prussia undertook to hold a plebiscite in the Danish part of the province of Schleswig to determine whether it should go to Denmark or Germany. By 1878 he had secured its formal revocation, and Danish Schleswig became German until 1918. Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron" celebrated its first great triumph in the war of 1863-64 against little Denmark.

On December 1, 1863, i.e. three weeks before the armed attack was launched on Denmark, a member of the Prussian Diet, von Sybel, demanded that the Prussian Government should work to bring about an "alliance between the three Scandinavian countries and a nationally united Germany". Thus for the first time, and at a very early date, the future objective of German power politics in Northern Europe was publicly formulated, because, of course, von Sybel naturally assumed that Germany would be the predominant partner in such a Scandinavian alliance.

2. NO EQUALITY OF RIGHTS FOR SMALL NATIONS.

In 1905, the year in which the Union of Norway and Sweden was dissolved, there were many conflicts to occupy the attention of the Great European Powers. In the Far East Tsarist Russia was at grips with Japan, and in the Mediterranean the Morocco conflict was coming to a head—to mention only two of many sources of danger. Norway had a common frontier of several hundred miles with Russia, but she felt that all the conflicts which were engaging the attention of Europe were too far away to interest her or embroil her in the disputes of the Great Powers.

She regarded the dissolution of the Union with Sweden as the ripe fruit of a long struggle for national independence and sover-

eignty. For hundreds of years Norwegians had worked and fought for liberty and justice—not only for themselves but for others. Norwegian volunteers had laid down their lives in Denmark's cause in the war with Prussia. Oppressed nations fighting for their freedom had always enjoyed the support of great Norwegians. Wergeland, Bjoernson, Ibsen and Nansen—their names are internationally known as staunch friends of the oppressed and exploited all over the world. On one occasion a passionate protest by Bjoernson electrified the world. In a letter to the President of the International Peace Conference which met in Munich in 1907 he defended the cause of the non-Magyar peoples oppressed by the Hungarian Government, and rejected the invitation extended to him to attend the Conference, staunch friend of international peace though he was, "because men who will behave there as though they were apostles of peace themselves indulge in oppression and racial persecution at home, or look quietly on whilst others persecute and oppress". And he added: "If, for instance, Count Albert Apponyi, who is now Minister for Public Instruction in Hungary, and in that capacity a shameless persecutor of the Slovaks, were to appear at the Conference as the representative of his nation, and I also were there, I should leave no stone unturned and should not rest until he had been removed from the Conference."

With the dissolution of the Union with Sweden the Norwegian peoples secured what most other peoples already possessed—the full sovereignty. Beyond that they desired nothing more than to live at peace with the Swedish people and with the rest of the world. However, bitter experience had shown them that not all the Great Powers favoured their just national aspirations. For instance, when, in 1893, Norway's representatives sought to secure consular recognition they were unsympathetically and bluntly told by the Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office that Norway was entering on a perilous course which might easily end in disaster.* When, in June 1905, Norway decided to sever the Union, the Kaiser hastily arranged a meeting with the Tsar on the island of Bjoerko in the Gulf of Finland to persuade him of the increasing urgency of "the English danger"—an Anglo-Russian Agreement followed two years later. The Kaiser was anxious to secure the support of the Tsar for Germany's candidate for the throne of Norway, Prince Waldemar of Denmark.

Writing a little later to his Reich's Chancellor von Buelow, the Kaiser declared: "If Carl is elected, England will have her finger in the Norwegian pie by fair means or foul." Carl—the second son of the late King of Denmark, Frederik VIII—was in fact shortly afterwards elected by the Norwegian people under the traditional name of Haakon. Of course, if the Kaiser had been able to do as he liked he would have put a Prussian Prince on the throne of

* Frederik Wedel Jarlsberg: *Die Reise durch das Leben*.

Norway, but as that was impossible he supported the candidature of Prince Waldemar, though in the end he had to accept Prince Carl.

He felt that the time was ripe for the founding of an anti-British Russo-German alliance to which the Scandinavian countries were to be harnessed. To make the proposition attractive to the Tsar the Kaiser proposed in the discussion at Bjoerko that Russia should obtain an ice-free outlet to the North Sea, and that for this purpose Norway should cede Tromsø.* The Tsar showed more caution than was pleasing to the Kaiser, but in the end he was persuaded to sign the agreement, and the two monarchs then returned to their respective courts, only to find that their responsible diplomats were by no means enthusiastic at their performance, and inclined to regard their agreement as a political nuisance. In the end, despite the Kaiser's opposition, the diplomats had their way and the Bjoerko agreement was quietly buried by mutual agreement.

Shortly after the meeting of the two monarchs on Bjoerko, 1905, Wilhelm II appeared in Sweden whilst the main German fleet visited Sweden's most important harbours. These visits were taken as an open demonstration of Germany's sympathy with the intransigent Swedish nationalists and a support of their plans. In any case, they left no doubt that Germany was determinedly opposed to the establishment of Norway's national sovereignty. The next German move was a similar visit by Wilhelm II to Denmark, which was also accompanied by German naval demonstrations in Danish harbours. Despite Germany's efforts to aggravate the situation, Norway's attitude towards Sweden was so conciliatory that the Swedish nationalists found it impossible to arouse sufficient enthusiasm amongst the Swedish people for war to oppose the dissolution of the Union. Norway even called on the Kaiser himself to act as arbitrator in certain questions which had been raised by the Swedish Government. This put the Kaiser in an awkward predicament, but he was so opposed to any amicable settlement of the dispute that he refused his offices.

On the other hand, both Great Britain and France brought their influence to bear on Sweden in favour of a peaceable solution of the conflict, and their efforts were not without effect. And finally the Swedish Social Democratic Party, under the leadership of Hjalmar Branting, came forward with a solemn declaration: "Should the conflict arising out of the dissolution of the Union lead to the outbreak of war Swedish Social Democracy will appeal to the working-class to declare a General Strike. The members of the Party are determined not to bear arms in such a struggle."

That finally put a stop to the agitation of the Swedish nationalists, and shortly afterwards the two countries settled their

* *The Times*, July 29th, 1905.

dispute amicably. The imperial exponent of Pan-Germanism, Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had pulled every wire to prevent the establishment of Norwegian national sovereignty because he regarded the independence of a free people as unfavourable to his own position in Northern Europe, had perforce to retire defeated.

3. A "QUITE HARMLESS" PACT.

Having achieved their full sovereignty, the Norwegian people were soon to find that German hostility had not ceased, and that their foreign policy, which aimed at consolidating and safeguarding the territorial integrity and strict neutrality of their country, had a dangerous opponent in German diplomacy. In 1855 Great Britain and France had concluded an agreement guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Norway and Sweden (then joined in the Union), and designed as a barrier to Russia's aggressive expansionism in the west, which both signatories desired to check. However, in view of the dissolution of the Union between Norway and Sweden the situation had changed, and the Norwegian Government felt that the old guarantee did not fit the new circumstances. The aim of Norway's foreign policy was therefore to secure an all-round guarantee of the inviolability of Norwegian territory and of her permanent neutrality. To this end the Norwegian Government proposed the conclusion of a pact between the four great Powers in question—Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia—solemnly recognizing the permanent neutrality of Norway and undertaking to maintain her territorial integrity by force of arms if necessary.

After several months of diplomatic negotiations the Norwegian Government presented the following draft Treaty to the four governments concerned:

"His Majesty the King of Norway and . . . have agreed to conclude a Treaty with a view to safeguarding the neutrality, territorial integrity and independence of Norway, and to this end they have appointed . . . as their respective Plenipotentiaries, who, after having exchanged their mandates and found them in good order and proper form, have agreed to the following:

"*Article I:* On its part the Norwegian Government declares its firm intention of maintaining permanent neutrality in accordance with the provisions of international law. However, it reserves to itself the right to approach the Swedish and Danish Governments, or either one of them, with a view to concluding an agreement to safeguard their neutrality by affording mutual support to each other;

"*Article II:* On its part the . . . Government undertakes to recognize and uphold in all respects the neutrality of Norway hereby declared by the Norwegian Government.

"*Article III:* The Norwegian Government undertakes to

cede no part of its territories to any other Power, or to grant any rights whatever to any other Power in respect of any such territories, and in particular in respect of the Norwegian coasts, and, in addition, it undertakes to permit no other Power to occupy any part of its territories.

"*Article IV:* The . . . Government undertakes that in the event of any threat to or violation of the national existence or independence of Norway it will lend the Norwegian Government its support when requested to do so by the latter, and, if necessary, to use, at the latter's request, both naval and military forces in sufficient strength and at its own cost to co-operate with Norway's own forces with a view to safeguarding the territorial integrity and national independence of Norway.

"*Article V:* The present Treaty shall remain in force for the space of twenty years from the day of ratification."

It is obvious that the sole intention of this draft was to safeguard the peace of Northern Europe. It clearly defined Norway's foreign policy, and documented her sincere and unqualified desire to remain permanently neutral, and to take up arms if necessary in defence of her neutrality and territorial integrity, and only for such cause. However, as far as Germany was concerned, Norway was merely a pawn in the game of power politics, and therefore Germany's diplomatic intrigues against her continued.

The double game which Germany was deliberately playing can be clearly seen from the fact that her attitude towards the Norwegian proposal in Petersburg was quite different from her attitude to the same proposal in London.

On November 15, 1906, after a confidential memorandum had been received from the Norwegian Government by the Powers concerned, setting out the terms of the subsequent draft Treaty, von Tschirschky, the Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office, wrote to von Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, instructing him to inform the British Government verbally and confidentially that his Government had no misgivings about meeting the wishes of the Norwegian Government.

However, despite this statement of the German Government in London, von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Petersburg, was egging on the Russian Government to oppose the granting of Norway's wishes, and in particular to reject the proposal for a guarantee of Norway's territorial integrity and permanent neutrality, and on December 24, 1906, von Schoen reported as follows to von Buelow, the German Reich's Chancellor:

"I may observe in confidence that I have had some part in giving rise to the misgivings which are felt here against any far-reaching undertaking with regard to a guarantee of Norway's territorial integrity, in so far as that from the very beginning

when the first Norwegian proposals arrived here, before the draft Treaty was presented, I informed M. Isvolsky that in my personal opinion a certain amount of caution was indicated with regard to the formulation of the guarantee. Apart from general considerations, I was thinking in particular of the possibility that when once the history of international law recorded a guarantee of Norway's neutrality by the Great Powers, Denmark, which, as we know, would like to see herself in a similar position, would then come forward with the proposal that a similar Treaty should be drawn up in her favour. However, the problem of Danish neutrality is much more complicated than that of Norway's because the question of the entrance to the Baltic arises at once, and the matter would therefore need a much closer scrutiny, particularly on our part. Once the Great Powers had bound themselves in a far-reaching fashion where Norway was concerned it would be very difficult for them to refuse Denmark similar accommodation without arousing the suspicion that *arrière-pensées* were involved."

Subsequently, von Tschirschky conveniently discovered that it was his duty to his country to see a trap set for Germany by Great Britain in Article IV of the draft Treaty, and on December 15, 1906, he wrote as follows to the Kaiser: "Whilst a preliminary examination seems to show that no serious objection need be raised to the first three Articles of the draft Treaty, we certainly ought to object to Article IV because its second part places an obligation on Germany to spend her money and shed her blood in defence of Norway's territorial integrity and independence. We could hardly take the responsibility for accepting such a one-sided obligation as long as it was not counterbalanced by any similar obligation on the part of Norway. I understand from a communication made to me by the Russian Ambassador at the instructions of Isvolsky that the formulation of Article IV was due to British instigation. Indeed, according to long-established British opinion, Britain has a lively interest in preventing any other Power from obtaining a foothold in Norway, and in particular in any harbour on Norway's coast."

Acting in agreement with the Russian Foreign Minister, the German Ambassador in Petersburg produced a counter-draft for the proposed Treaty. According to this the Great Powers would merely undertake to respect the permanent neutrality, independence and territorial integrity of Norway. The second passage of Article III of this counter-draft read as follows: "This principle will stand under the protection of the joint guarantee of the signatory Powers to the present agreement and those who may later join it."

The clear and straightforward phraseology of the Norwegian draft was replaced by ambiguous formulations which were less binding and open to varied interpretation. Norway's reservation

of the right to conclude a mutual guarantee pact with the other Scandinavian States for the joint protection of their neutrality and territorial integrity was rejected. On the whole the German Foreign Office was satisfied with the counter-draft, and writing to von Schoen in Petersburg von Tschirschky declared: "The counter-project now presented by Your Excellency seems to us to be on the whole a useful basis for the negotiations with the Western Powers. However, we consider it better to strike out the second paragraph of Article III because this provision might be interpreted to mean that the contracting parties were under an obligation to maintain the neutrality, independence and territorial integrity of Norway by force of arms, which, of course, does not lie in Russia's intentions either. . . . However, if M. Isvolsky should object that the formulation of Paragraph 2, Article III of the draft does not involve an unconditional obligation on the signatory Powers to undertake armed action, and if you should get the impression that he would not oppose the probable demand on the part of the Western Powers for the inclusion of a similar passage, then you can declare yourself willing to agree to the retention of Paragraph 2, Article III. It would be undesirable that such a provision were included subsequently under pressure from the Western Powers, and then perhaps in a form which might be less convenient to us."

Thus if the German Government had had its way it would gladly have deprived the Pact of the last vestige of its significance. However, it feared that if the emptiness of the Pact were too obvious, Great Britain and France would not agree to it, and would press for more definite formulations. Von Schoen answered von Tschirschky as follows: "M. Isvolsky did, in fact, harbour doubts about the complete abandonment of the guarantee clause in Article III of our counter-draft, feeling that the omission would be too obvious and likely to cause the other Powers to suggest a formulation which would be unwelcome to us. Compared with the Norwegian draft he considers our version, which is based largely on the Luxemburg example, to be *quite harmless*, and to exclude the obligation of rendering armed assistance."

The Norwegian Government was naturally not satisfied with this "quite harmless" counter-draft of the Russian and German Governments, and it replied with a new draft, which retained the Scandinavian guarantee clause and sought to give its provisions the character of a guarantee on the part of all the Great Powers to defend the territorial integrity and neutrality of Norway. A memorandum sent by von Schoen to the German Reich's Chancellor, von Buelow, and described as "a Russian memorandum", declared the new Norwegian proposals to be "unacceptable for juridical and political reasons". This memorandum was marked "Confidential", and this no doubt explains the remarkable frankness with which it discusses the political strategy of Germany and Russia towards Norway and the other Scandinavian countries:

"The present Norwegian proposal, which envisages the formation of a Scandinavian neutrality pact, and reserves full freedom of action to Norway in the event of war's threatening this Scandinavian League, was unacceptable for juridical and political reasons.

"The Great Powers could not enter into negotiations with one Scandinavian State with regard to matters which touched all three in common, particularly in view of the fact that at the moment neither Sweden nor Denmark seemed to evince any interest in the question of a Scandinavian League.

"From a political standpoint there was still greater objection to the Norwegian proposal for the formation of an inter-Scandinavian League, which would obviously open up a new phase in Scandinavian and Baltic politics.

"The Russian Government believed itself at one with the German Imperial Government in the opinion that the formation of a Scandinavian League pledged to permanent neutrality was not in their interest, less in the German interest than in the Russian, in fact, because such a League would inevitably lead to the neutralization of Danish waterways along the lines of the Suez Canal.

"The Russian Government was therefore of the opinion that:

"(1) The new Norwegian draft Treaty was unacceptable to the two imperial Powers;

"2. These two Powers should direct their efforts to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the relations between the three Scandinavian States; and

"3. They should oppose any extension of permanent neutrality to all three Scandinavian States, and negotiate exclusively with Norway concerning the recognition of her neutrality, without any participation by the other two Scandinavian States."

It is odd that this alleged Russian memorandum is in complete accordance with the instructions sent only a little while before to the German Ambassador in Petersburg by the German Foreign Office.

The alleged belief of the German Foreign Office that Norway's attitude was instigated by Great Britain was shown to be without foundation in a report from the German Ambassador in London, von Metternich, to the Reich's Chancellor, von Buelow: "I have been unable to find any reason for thinking that Great Britain's policy aims at holding open Norway's harbours for the British fleet in the event of war by extending the terms of the neutrality declaration. *Under certain circumstances these harbours might prove just as valuable to our fleet as a haven and a refuge as to the British fleet.* Up to the present I can also find no reason for

supposing that Great Britain is working to secure the foundation of a league of Scandinavian States amongst themselves."

The negotiations and intrigues dragged on for over a year, and when the Pact was finally signed on November 2, 1907, it bore very little resemblance to the Pact the Norwegian Government wished to secure when it opened up negotiations with the Great Powers. Its finally agreed text read as follows:

"Animated by a desire to ensure independence and territorial integrity as well as the benefits of peace to Norway within her present territorial limits and neutral zone, the Co-Signatory Powers have resolved to conclude a Treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries" (here follows an enumeration of the names and titles of the Plenipotentiaries) "who, after having exchanged their mandates and found them to be good and in due form, have agreed to the following:

"Article I: The Norwegian Government undertakes to cede no part of Norwegian territory to any Power either by way of occupation or by way of any arrangement;

"Article II: The German, French, British and Russian Governments recognize and undertake to respect the integrity of Norway. If that integrity is menaced or violated by any Power, the German, French, British and Russian Governments undertake, after a previous communication to that effect to the Norwegian Government, to furnish by the means they may consider appropriate their support to this Government with a view to safeguarding the integrity of Norway;

"Article III: The present Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years from the day of its ratification. Should the Treaty not have been denounced by any of the parties to it at least two years before the expiring of the said period, it will remain in force in the same manner for a further period of ten years, and so forth. In the event of the Treaty's being denounced by one of the Powers which participated with Norway in its conclusion this denunciation will take effect only in regard to that Power;

"Article IV: The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged in Christiania as soon as possible.

"In earnest of which the Plenipotentiaries have appended their signatures, etc.

"Christiania, November 2, 1907."

Thus, the Scandinavian neutrality clause and the undertaking to protect Norwegian neutrality were left out, whilst the guarantee of Norway's territorial inviolability was couched in such vague terms that its value was rendered highly problematical. In short, together with Russia, Germany had succeeded in sabotaging the conclusion of a plain and straightforward guarantee pact for the preservation of Norway's neutrality and territorial integrity. In addition she

had succeeded in preventing the formation of a Scandinavian League as a real instrument for maintaining the peace in Northern Europe, a possibility which the Norwegian Government wished to leave open. And, above all, she had succeeded in preventing the erection of barriers—even if they were only paper barriers—to the subsequent fulfilment of her plans of aggression.

Whilst pursuing a tremendously costly naval building programme, Germany deliberately intensified Anglo-German disagreement, and took a pleasure in isolating the small States from each other, and using first one and then the other of them as pawns in the dangerous game of power politics she was playing. Germany's plans demanded that she should improve her strategic situation in the event of a war with Great Britain. She already regarded the occupation of Denmark's harbours as essential, and she was arriving more and more at the conclusion that Norway's harbours would be desirable also. Preparations for the seizure of certain places on the coast of South Norway was her next step.

Little Norway's honest foreign policy of peace and neutrality had no chance of success against the machinations of such a powerful and unscrupulous enemy.

4. NORWAY NOT A NORTH-SEA POWER!

The Pact guaranteeing Norway's territorial integrity was not yet signed when Germany opened up new negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement to maintain the *status quo* in the North Sea. Before Germany began negotiations with Great Britain she had already come to a secret arrangement with Russia in the Baltic. Sweden and Denmark were to be included in the deal, which was to guarantee the *status quo* in the Baltic and exclude Great Britain from all future say in Baltic affairs. The anti-British complexion of the affair was heightened by the fact that the Anglo-French Guarantee Pact protecting Sweden's neutrality and prohibiting the fortification of the Aaland Islands by Russia was still in force.

Writing to the Reich's Chancellor, von Buelow, the German Ambassador in London declared: "The North-Sea Agreement is the sugar-coating for the bitter Baltic pill." In these North-Sea negotiations it was once again the aim of Germany's diplomacy to secure the vaguest possible formulation of the obligation to maintain the *status quo* in the North Sea and in the countries littoral to it and to leave room for the widest interpretation, to play the small States off against each other, to isolate them and treat their right to equal consideration with contempt.

Although the North-Sea Agreement was to be arrived at between all the States littoral to the North Sea, including, of course, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway, Germany insisted that Belgium and Norway should be excluded from the negotiations and not be included amongst the signatory Powers. "Belgium does not really lie on the North Sea, but only

on the English Channel," Germany declared. And what about Norway? Oh, "Norway really lies away from the North Sea more to the Arctic Ocean," declared the German Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, when asked what countries Germany thought should be included in the agreement. This was as dishonest as the second argument that as Norway was already protected by a guarantee of her neutrality it was not necessary to include her as a signatory. As the Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office put it: "Norway has just been guaranteed the preservation of the *status quo* where her own integrity is concerned so that she cannot reasonably be offered a guarantee of her *status quo* once again."

Germany was not hard up for specious arguments. When it was suggested that, after all, Norway was a North-Sea Power and should be included in the agreement, her diplomacy answered that if Norway were included Sweden would have to be included as well, "and it may be assumed that neither Norway nor Sweden is at all anxious to join in a new agreement together". In addition, Germany declared that as Norway was a guaranteed State she could not expect the Great Powers to treat her as a full partner in any negotiations.

What was really at stake for Germany was admitted by the German Ambassador in London in a report to the German Reich's Chancellor, von Buelow, dealing with the Anglo-French proposal to secure a joint agreement concerning the North Sea and the Baltic. He concluded: "We must maintain our standpoint that an inclusive agreement is not acceptable to us. Such an agreement would assign us the role of fifth wheel on the waggon, and force foreign domination in the Baltic on to us, whereas the Baltic is our sea and that of the other three littoral States. With separate agreements, on the other hand, we should play a leading role."

The leading role! That was what Germany was always after in all her foreign political machinations. If Norway was kept out of it ("England's finger was always in Norway's pie"—it must be remembered), then first of all Norway was once again isolated, and secondly it was made easier for Germany to obtain the leading role she so much desired. Divide and rule was her motto even then. At first the Norwegian Government did not protest against its exclusion from the negotiations, and when she later requested that she be admitted as a signatory to the North-Sea Agreement her request was rejected, so that the final agreement did not bear the signature of a Power most obviously littoral to the North Sea.

5. A LONG-PLANNED VIOLATION.

Great Britain was the enemy, and the idea of war constantly occupied the diseased brain of the Kaiser. The ruling classes in Germany, the Junkers and the heavy industrialists, deliberately prepared for this war, and the loud complaints at Germany's unfavourable

geographic situation were intended to justify the drive she was planning into Denmark and still farther north into Norway. The following is taken from a secret report, dated December 2, 1904, made by the German diplomat von Schoen, who accompanied the Kaiser on his annual northern cruises, to the German Reich's Chancellor, von Buelow, concerning discussions with the Kaiser and his retinue:

"In such a case His Majesty would consider it absolutely essential that the monstrous British provocations should be resisted with armed force, and that hostile undertakings against our North Sea and Baltic coastline should be warded off by rapid and far-reaching military measures. In this connection His Majesty would be unable to avoid abandoning the consideration shown up to the present to both big and small neighbours, and not always appreciated in some quarters at its true value, and facing them with the question, to be answered within a very short space of time, as to whether they wished to be regarded as our friends and allies in the struggle or as the friends and allies of our enemy. Such ultimatums would be presented in Paris, Brussels, The Hague and Copenhagen. In the last-named place they would be accompanied simultaneously by the occupation of certain strategic points in and around the Danish Baltic inlets. Denmark would, of course, appeal to her neutrality, but as she possessed only miserably inadequate means of maintaining and defending it successfully this would be useless. Further—and His Majesty stressed this point in particular—Denmark's neutrality was rendered illusory by the fact that she supplied pilots to foreign warships and granted them passage through the Danish channels. In answer to my observation that in providing such pilots Denmark was acting only in accordance with International Law (The Sund Agreements), long-standing traditions and practical necessity, His Majesty replied that such things would just have to be ignored. On another occasion His Majesty returned to the Danish question with the remark that Denmark would have to make up her mind to place herself under the protection of the German Reich in one way or the other, first in the form of a Customs Union and later by military arrangements, and in return her possessions would be guaranteed. During the lifetime of King Christian the Kaiser would be prepared to show consideration; after that it would not be necessary. Speaking to me at table, Adjutant-General von Pless expressed the same opinions concerning Denmark as His Majesty."

Germany's long-planned intention to violate Denmark's neutrality and to make her the first northern victim of Germany's aggressive plans has seldom been more cynically and brutally

described. The plans of some of Germany's naval experts went even further. Even before the First World War Germany's war-mongers were suspicious of Norway as pro-English and therefore hostile to their plans of aggression. They were well aware, of course, that in Norway's case, too, the means at her disposal to protect and maintain her neutrality were "miserably inadequate".

In this case, as in all others, Germany's aggressive intentions were justified by the alleged aggressive intentions of others, and in one of his notorious marginal notes the Kaiser wrote on a diplomatic document in 1907: "If it suits England in her fight against us she will immediately seize Norway's southern harbours." Germany's leaders always try to present their crimes against international law and common humanity as defensive acts forced upon them by the threatening aggression of others. Preceding the violation of Norway they acted "in order that no other Power obtains a foothold in Norway and, above all, in Norwegian harbours".

III

GEO-POLITICS

1. THE ICE-FREE COAST OF THE ARCTIC.

Norway extends from latitude 57 in the south, roughly opposite the north of Scotland, to latitude 71 in the north. Her northernmost towns and harbours are further into the Arctic than Murmansk in Russia or Nome in Alaska, and farther north than the Bering Straits, which divide Asia from America. A Norwegian from Mandal in the south is as the crow flies as far away from a Norwegian in Hammerfest, Kirkenes and Vardoe in the north as he is from an Italian living in Rome. And in fact if the Norwegian in Mandal wanted to visit the Italian in Rome he could do it in a very much shorter time than it would take him to visit any of the Norwegians in the northern towns we have mentioned. The numerous chains of mountains, and still more the long, narrow fjords which cut laterally into the country, and the sparse distribution of the population in the north, have made it very difficult and expensive to maintain uninterrupted land communications between the north and south of the country. Even today there is no continuous road from north to south, and no direct railway line between Hammerfest or Tromsø and the south.

The length of Norway's unbroken coastline is 1,700 miles; including fjords and larger islands it is more than 12,000 miles—or half the distance round the Equator.

The fact that the Gulf Stream flows along the Norwegian coast has created comparatively favourable conditions for human habitation and given the country a certain importance in the political

relations of the peoples. The whole of the coast with all its harbours is ice-free. It has often been said that the urge of Tsarist Russia for westward expansion was not satisfied with the occupation of Finland at the beginning of last century, and that she looked with covetous eyes towards the harbours of North Norway as a basis for her operations across the North Atlantic. In comparison with Murmansk, Kirkenes lies about 100 miles nearer the Atlantic, Hammerfest about 250 miles nearer, Tromsø about 400 miles nearer, and Narvik about 450 miles nearer.

However, the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the declaration of Finnish independence greatly diminished any danger to Norway on the part of Russia. In 1918 Russia ceased to be a direct neighbour of Norway.

In the years before the present war Finland officially pursued a policy of close collaboration with Norway, Sweden and Denmark, but there was a group of extreme nationalists which demanded a revision of the north-west frontier of Finland, and the annexation of certain Norwegian territory. This group was willing to make Finland a bridge over which Germany could attack the Soviet Union.

Germany kept these possibilities constantly in mind, and the German Reichswehr maintained the closest relations with leading Finnish military circles from the very first years of the Weimar Republic down to the entry of Finland into the present World War on the side of Nazi Germany against Soviet Russia in June 1941.

2. THE SITUATION ON THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

Norway was subjected to greater pressure from the south than from the east, and with the increasing changes in world economic and political relations the pressure steadily increased. The rapid development of international communications, the enormously increased volume of world trade, the rise of Germany to be one of the leading export countries in the world, and the increasing share of world trade secured by the United States lent growing importance to the territories bordering on the North Sea. Norway also participated in this development. Her share of world trade steadily increased, the tonnage of her mercantile marine grew, and the Norwegian flag was seen increasingly in all the harbours of the world.

On the surface this development was peaceful enough, but very early on dangers began to be apparent, and they became more and more urgent as time went on. The tremendous progress of capitalist economy in Germany drove her ruling classes to seek bigger markets for her export goods, and from the beginning they were not particular as to the means they employed. Germany's Government proclaimed the absolute necessity of a big fleet, a fleet second only to that of Great Britain. The protection of Germany's seaways (no one threatened them) became a permanent slogan of the

Big-Navy propagandists. "Germany must become a Great Sea Power!" "Germany must make herself strong!" "Germany must keep open the seaways in all parts of the world!"

Or as one leading Pan-German put it: "Germany must make herself such a position that in future it will be impossible for the strongest land coalition and the strongest Sea Power to bar her from the oceans of the world. . . . Germany must act like the Prophet: if the mountain refused to come to Mahomet, Mahomet went to the mountain. Germany must do the same. The free ocean has not come to Germany; Germany must therefore go to the free ocean. By political measures we must offset the disadvantage of our geographical position." Of course, all this blatant aggressive propaganda was conducted as though Germany was defending herself against injustice done to her by malicious and envious opponents, though since the foundation of the Reich no one had done anything to obstruct the free development of her economic system and the growth of her share in world trade.

During the years before the outbreak of the First World War the German Navy made a thorough and detailed study of Norwegian territorial waters. Careful soundings were taken, charts were made and meteorological conditions carefully studied. All these investigations were carried out by naval parties camouflaged as harmless "yachtsmen", "holiday-makers", and so on, and official German publicity was always careful to represent the Norwegian coastline as entirely unsuited for war purposes. In 1912 the German *Marine-Rundschau* wrote: "Along the whole thousand-mile length of the Norwegian coast . . . there is hardly a suitable point for an operational basis. There are certainly very many places suited as places of refuge and hiding, and very many places from which a naval guerilla war might be conducted against enemy shipping, but at the same time there are very many places which are quite indefensible and open to attack. The geographical situation is not favourable for modern naval operations."

In their public utterances Germany's naval strategists deliberately underestimated the strategic value of Norway's coastline for naval operations, and this was done solely in order to mislead the other Powers. In reality Germany's naval experts were well aware of the strategic importance of Norway's coastline and her harbours in the war they were preparing against Great Britain. In fact, their tactical deliberations were primarily directed towards discovering the best way in which Great Britain could be taken in the flank. It is only 185 miles from Norway to the Shetland Islands, 337 miles from Esbjerg in Denmark to Harwich, 340 miles from Stavanger in Norway to Newcastle, and 435 miles from Kristiansand to Edinburgh.

Further, quite apart from Norway's economic reserves, the possession of the Norwegian coast or its most important harbours would mean that Germany could keep her entrance to the North

Sea open. All these tactical considerations were ever present in the minds of Germany's naval experts under the Weimar Republic and subsequently in Nazi Germany, and they never abandoned the strategic plans of imperial Germany.

In an article in the *Marine-Rundschau* published in May 1933 Dr. M. Sell discusses the tremendous importance of Norway in a war of Great Britain against Russia: "Norway lies across the lines of communications in such a fashion that she is likely to be drawn into any struggle between the Great Powers: the settlement of accounts between the Great Naval Powers and Russia. In fact, Norway . . . is not only likely to be drawn into the struggle, but her territory might well become an arena of hostilities. The line of attack by the great Sea Powers against Murmansk lies round the North Cape, and the most direct west-east connections to the Aaland Islands and the Gulf of Finland are from Narvik over the railway to Finland, and from Trondjhem over the Stjoerdal railway and Stockholm. The naval line of approach past Germany to the Polish and Russian Baltic coasts lies through the Skagerrak and Kattegat."

However, before we follow this up let us see how Germany, which was not in a position to launch a direct attack during the First World War, did her utmost to undermine the neutrality of Norway by all sorts of intrigues and machinations.

IV. 1914-18—THE ATTACK ON NORWAY'S NEUTRALITY

1. WHAT SAVED NORWAY?

In the summer of 1911 the conflict between France and Germany flared up over the Morocco crisis. As the crisis developed a war between France and Germany seemed more and more likely. The British Government left no doubt about the fact that in the event of an attack by Germany upon France she would not stand by with folded arms.

At the height of the crisis, on July 22, 1911, a number of German warships suddenly cast anchor in Drammensfiord. There were eleven German torpedo-boats in the flotilla. On the following day the German High Seas Fleet steamed into the Norwegian Westland fiord and carried out various exercises. A number of these ships anchored in the harbour of Bergen. The fleet was composed of 5 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers and 5 other vessels.

Germany's fleet had thus taken up its position in Norwegian harbours and waters in expectation of the outbreak of war and in order to have more favourable strategic bases for operations against the British Navy. The Treaty in which Germany had

agreed to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Norwegian neutrality and the inviolability of her neutral zone was hardly four years old when it was brushed aside in this way as a valueless piece of paper.

This alarming incident and the rapid gathering of the war clouds over Europe were no doubt what caused the Norwegian Government to introduce a Bill at the beginning of 1912 for the strengthening of Norway's naval armaments. In introducing this measure the Government's spokesman pointed out that the Norwegian Navy had been allowed to decline in strength. Recent events had shown that the hope that international agreements and the respect of International Law amongst the peoples would be sufficient to prevent Norway's being embroiled in war could no longer be maintained with confidence. The centre of military and political events in Europe had shifted towards the north, and Norway could no longer rely on her geographical situation to save her from being embroiled if the Great Powers should one day attempt to solve their conflicting interests by force of arms.

Although general confidence in the sanctity of international agreements and treaties had just received a rude shock, the Norwegian Government nevertheless continued its policy of working to consolidate the neutrality of its country in any future war between the Great Powers. At the end of 1912 it joined with the Danish and Swedish Governments in the publication of a declaration concerning the maintenance of their neutrality in the event of war. This declaration limited itself largely to a repetition of the principles laid down by The Hague Convention in 1907 for naval warfare together with an explanation of their application to northern waters.

After the outbreak of war in August 1914 the three Governments confirmed this declaration of neutrality. In the autumn of the first year of war, and at intervals until its end, conferences of the three Kings and the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden and Denmark took place to discuss developments, their effect on the Scandinavian countries and the possible future consequences. The three Scandinavian countries did, in fact, succeed, as is now a matter of history, in keeping themselves out of the First World War. From the beginning of the war the Kaiser and his naval experts decided not to risk a decisive action with the British fleet, which might have proved fatal to the German Navy, and such an action would have been unavoidable had any attempt been made to land German troops on the coast of Norway. The one big naval action which did take place, the Battle of Jutland, resulted in such severe losses for the Germany Navy that from then on to the end of the war no attempt was made on the part of the German High Seas Fleet to leave the security of its bases. This was also the reason why no attempt was made to seize Norway's harbours. It was the superior strength of the British Navy and nothing else which preserved the peace in Northern Europe during the First World War.

After Germany's defeat her war historians and naval strategists declared that the lack of activity on the part of her fleet at the beginning of the war had been a very serious if not fatal mistake in her conduct of the war. One of Germany's statesmen, Karl Helfferich, later revealed some of the reasons which determined the political leaders of the German Reich during the First World War not to make any attack on Norway, which they regarded as an undertaking whose upshot would have been highly uncertain: "We succeeded not only in maintaining, but even in improving, our position in Switzerland and Sweden, and for a long time even in Norway, which was accommodating towards England and hardly dependent on supplies from Germany. That was true not only of important agricultural and fishery supplies, but also of certain raw materials of the greatest importance for our war industries. For instance, we succeeded in maintaining our imports of Swedish iron ore, which was almost essential to the production of our steel industry, and we also imported ferro-silicum and other important ferro-alloys. Norway was the only country which continued to supply us and our allies during the war with at least modest amounts of nickel, a metal which was of great importance to our war industries. We also received copper and pyrites and large quantities of saltpetre."

If Germany had attacked Norway and been unsuccessful she would have cut herself off from the sources of these important raw materials. But although German troops did not land in Norway and occupy her harbours and towns, and although her towns and villages were not laid waste, Germany made her pay heavily for the privilege of not dragging her into the war.

2. GERMAN SPIES AND GERMAN PROPAGANDA.

The German Government carried on the war in neutral countries with two special weapons—propaganda and espionage. A flood of propaganda material swept over Norway from Germany and Denmark. The intellectual and upper classes rather than the workers and peasants were the main object of this campaign. All the lies about the treacherous *franc-tireur* war of the Belgians were spread in word and illustration, and everything possible was done to persuade the Norwegians that Germany was innocent of the outbreak of war.

The aim of all this propaganda was to persuade the Norwegian people that their safety and independence was more threatened by the British than by the Germans, and that therefore they should abandon their neutrality and enter the war on the side of Germany, which was, of course, completely innocent of all guilt in the war and was waging it in a pure and disinterested fashion in the interests of humanity.

From time to time, when it was felt that the propaganda was not going quite as well as might have been expected, the German

Press did its best to assist with threats and warnings. Despite this the campaign was not a very great success, and when in May 1917 the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra offered to bring "German Culture" to Oslo at a time when German submarines were sinking Norwegian merchant ships and drowning Norwegian sailors, the Norwegians declined the offer. The refusal expressed no hostility to German musical culture, but the authorities were not anxious to let in still more German agents, and it had already had many and bitter experiences of the overt and covert activities of these people. In Oslo and in the western harbours there were hosts of German spies who had come to the country in the guise of fish-buyers, tourists, etc.

A notorious espionage case caused great public indignation in 1917. A Baron von Rautenfels was an official courier of the German Foreign Office and as such he was accustomed to travel regularly between Berlin and Oslo with official diplomatic baggage. One day the good Baron arrived with his sealed baggage as usual, but something must have gone wrong, for this time he was arrested, despite his protests. Certain further arrests in the affair were made the same day, including that of a tailor in Porsgrund. A search of the tailor's quarters revealed some interesting stock-in-trade: nothing less than a complete bomb store packed in seven trunks, including 211 infernal machines of various shapes and sizes, some made to resemble bunker coal, 269 detonators, 33 bombs disguised as rolls of chewing-tobacco, 32 disguised as cigarettes, and so on. The Baron's trunk, which was despatched in diplomatic form by the Foreign Office in Berlin to the address "German Legation, Christiania" (as Oslo was still called at that time), and was sealed with the official diplomatic seals, was kept in the hands of the police, and the German Legation was invited to send a representative to be present at its opening. When the stated time arrived no one turned up from the German Legation, but the German Minister sent an indignant protest at the proposed opening of diplomatic baggage. The Norwegian police authorities apparently felt themselves on very safe ground, for they opened it despite the protest. Sure enough, it contained 55 bombs.

One of the arrested persons admitted that the bombs were intended for smuggling aboard United States ships. The lame German version was that they were intended for revolutionary purposes in Finland. Hjalmar Branting, the leader of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, protested vigorously against these German methods of waging war: "As long as the German people themselves do not sweep away those who dishonour their name by adopting methods of warfare which sink to the level of bandit morality the world will have to regard this complaisant and obedient people as at one with its rulers." Such methods of war accorded completely with the mentality of the German ruling classes. Any means, however low and treacherous, were considered justified if they

promised to serve Germany's ends. Solemnly concluded treaties and international law were of no account whatever in their eyes.

3. THE BANDIT MORALITY OF GERMANY'S WAR METHODS.

As soon as war was declared German submarines began to torpedo Norwegian ships. Norway maintained the strictest neutrality towards both belligerent parties, but in the interests of her own people she had to maintain her foreign trade as far as possible at pre-war level. In addition, it was in the interests of all the belligerent countries that Norwegian supplies of goods needed for the prosecution of the war or for the feeding of their peoples should be maintained. Germany, in fact, by 1915 increased her imports from Norway compared with 1913 from 67 million to 181 million Norwegian crowns, or by approximately 170 per cent. What Germany herself demanded from the neutral State Norway it refused when it was a question of equal rights for other belligerents.

On February 5, 1915, the German Government announced: "All the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, and all English seas, are hereby declared to be a war zone. From February 18 all ships of the enemy mercantile marine in these waters will be destroyed, and it will not always be possible to avoid danger to their crews and passengers." Although the declaration refers to ships of the enemy mercantile marine it was also directed against neutral shipping, as the results quickly demonstrated. In 1915, 79 ships of the Norwegian mercantile marine were sunk by torpedoes and 171 lives were lost. These ships flew the Norwegian flag and were all on their lawful occasions strictly in accordance with the provisions of International Law. Their unarmed crews fell victims to Germany's submarine "heroes".

German submarines sneaked through Danish and Norwegian territorial waters, breaking International Law by the use of neutral zones for the preparation of belligerent acts, and then committed the crime of attacking neutrals. During the week-end of April 1, 1916, four Norwegian ships were sunk by German submarines. Week after week new losses were announced. In the five days from September 26 to September 30, 1916, inclusive, no fewer than ten Norwegian ships were sunk in the Arctic Circle by German submarines which must have made their way there through Norwegian territorial waters, thus violating Norwegian neutrality.

The time had obviously arrived for Norway to protect herself as far as a little neutral State can protect itself against the aggression of a powerful and ruthless belligerent neighbour, and on October 13, 1916, the Norwegian Government announced: "Warships of belligerent Powers, including submarines, are prohibited from entering Norwegian territorial waters in the future except for the purpose of saving human life in danger owing to the stress of

weather. Such warships, including submarines, which disregard this prohibition will risk attack."

This action on the part of the Norwegian Government to protect its country's neutrality and to protect the lives of its seamen, its ships and their cargoes met with a vigorous protest on the part of the German Government, which demanded in the tone of an ultimatum that the prohibition should be withdrawn. The protest was accompanied by a fierce Press campaign in the German newspapers against Norway. The *Koelnische Zeitung*, whilst pretending that anti-British feelings were rapidly growing in Norway, admitted sorrowfully that no change had taken place in favour of Germany, and that the Norwegians still obstinately refused to welcome and applaud the growth of German sea power. It even admitted that hostility to Germany was also on the increase owing to German submarine activities, and it concluded that the Norwegians were long past all friendly persuasion: "No preaching will help here. Words will effect no conversions. *Like our enemies, the Norwegian people need good hard German blows to teach them better.*" The *Lokal-Anzeiger* in Berlin demanded the breaking off of all diplomatic relations with Norway, and threatened her with war if she persisted in maintaining the prohibition.

Of course, the old German trick of accusing the victim of the crime was again used, and the Norwegian Government was accused of a violation of neutrality and International Law. In addition it was accused of violating the Scandinavian neutrality declaration. The aim of this infamous trick was to break up the joint Scandinavian neutrality front of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and to isolate Norway from the other two countries in order to be able to deal with her better.

The fierce hunt after Norwegian ships which was carried out simultaneously by German submarines seemed to suggest that the Germans had dropped all consideration towards Norway as a neutral and regarded her more as an enemy belligerent. In the twelve days from October 20 to November 1, 1916, no fewer than thirty-three Norwegian ships were sunk. By the end of the year the Norwegian mercantile marine had lost 200 vessels, all unarmed and all sailing clearly under a neutral flag.

Germany's political representatives adopted, at least outwardly, a somewhat different attitude, and in October 1916 representatives of the German Government appeared in Oslo, not to secure the withdrawal of the prohibition, but to conclude a trading agreement as quickly as possible and as favourably as possible for Germany. Three months later a provisional German-Norwegian trading agreement was drawn up, and on February 9, 1917, the German Government announced that it considered the incident in connection with the prohibition issued by the Norwegian Government to be closed, although the prohibition had not been withdrawn. Further supplies of fish, nickel and other raw materials for Germany's war

production had been obtained, and therefore the campaign of incitement in the German Press ceased and diplomatic and political pressure was relaxed.

However, the unrestricted submarine campaign which Germany launched against Great Britain as from February 1, 1917 (the German people were assured that it would bring Great Britain to her knees within three or at the most four months), again brought about increased German attacks on Norway's neutrality. The figures of Norway's shipping losses began to rise steeply. The total Norwegian tonnage on the high seas in 1917 was only about half that in 1915. And during 1918 there was a further decrease of about 20 per cent. This German stranglehold on Norway's shipping resulted in severe economic and social distress in Norway, but she still held fast to her neutrality. When President Wilson of the United States addressed a Note to all neutral countries, including Norway, with a view to organizing joint action on their part against the unrestricted German submarine campaign, the Norwegian Government refused to take part. Together with the Governments of Sweden and Denmark it sent a protest Note to Berlin pointing out that the unrestricted submarine campaign was in violation of International Law, and that neutral countries had the right by international agreement recognized by Germany to ply the high seas on their lawful occasions even in time of war. The Note made no impression on the German Government, and the unrestricted submarine campaign continued. In fact, during a debate on the subject which took place in the German Reichstag in the spring of 1917 the Conservatives, the National Liberals and the Catholics demanded that the full weight of the unrestricted submarine campaign should be directed against neutral shipping as well. . . . This was, in fact, already being done.

The German submarine campaign cost Norway half her mercantile marine and the lives of 2,000 of her seamen. The following percentage figures show that the neutral countries suffered proportionately more from unrestricted submarine warfare on Germany's part than even the belligerents, and Norway suffered heaviest of all.

Percentage of Mercantile Tonnage Lost by Various Countries during the First World War

Norway	49.6	Belgium	24.4
Italy	46.6	Spain	20.9
Greece	41.8	Sweden	17.9
France	39.7	Holland	13.5
Great Britain	37.6	Japan	7.5
Denmark	25.7	United States	6.8

In their deliberate attacks on Norwegian shipping the Germans were also influenced by a desire to weaken the strongest mercantile marine in the world after the British and the German. Whatever

happened, whether the Germans won the war or not, it would be to their advantage after the war if the mercantile tonnage of their enemies and competitors was reduced. Germany therefore did not hesitate to trample all the international laws of war underfoot and to violate the neutrality of other countries whenever it suited her.

4. FROM THE NORTH CAPE TO BAGHDAD.

Norway occupied a very definite place in the pre-war plans of Germany's imperialist aggressors. Pan-German propaganda in the Press, in professorial lectures and in the programmes of political parties, constantly demanded that the North Sea should be "free", that it should, in fact, be a "German Ocean". Although Norway's name was not always mentioned, in the background was always the plan to force her into the ambit of Germany's "sphere of influence".

Ballin, the General Director of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, put the position as far as Germany was concerned with commendable frankness: "The stranglehold which the British Navy has been able to fasten on our overseas trade, bringing it almost to a standstill, has been made possible only because it is so easy to blockade the North Sea. This and the piratical pressure which Great Britain is now exercising on the neutral Scandinavian States and on Holland would be impossible if our fleet had a base in accordance with its size and importance which would permit our gallant officers and men to develop their fighting capacities adequately. We must therefore go out into the North Sea and find ourselves a naval base which would guarantee us the same advantages in this part of the world as Great Britain at present enjoys and ruthlessly exploits."

Naturally, it was not a question of "the same advantages". In peace-time Germany had the same advantages as Great Britain or any other maritime nation. How could Germany have so rapidly become one of the greatest shipping Powers and trade Powers in the world if she had not enjoyed at least "the same advantages" as Great Britain? What Germany was really after was not "the same advantages", but monopolist advantages which would permit her to establish German predominance in the North Sea and in the rest of the world. Rejecting the suggestion that Germany should turn her attention to the East, the *Rheinisch-Westfaelische Zeitung* declared: "The German Reich does not lie on the Dardanelles or on the Persian Gulf, but on the North Sea. We shall be free only when the North Sea is free." The propaganda in favour of Germany's war aims left no doubt about the fact that as far as Germany was concerned she would consider the North Sea "free" only when the Scandinavian countries Norway, Sweden and Denmark were all safely in her pocket.

"The extent of the Central European League, and the number of countries which must join it, has been indicated repeatedly

already: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Rumania and Bulgaria must join one after the other in the commonwealth to be founded by the two imperial Powers. Together with Turkey they will then form the much-discussed 'North Cape to Baghdad Confederacy'.

"After the war the juggling with the old 'Balance of Power' theory must cease, and with it the futility of 'guaranteed neutrality' for countries which, as experience has shown, cannot be neutral.

"The Germanic States will, however, be invited to sign the Treaty of Alliance established first of all by the two imperial Powers and Turkey and joined by the Balkan kingdoms, and proposals will be made to the small States, although the advantage will be largely on their side, whose acceptance will justify themselves in their own eyes in abandoning their so-called 'neutrality'.

"For instance, Denmark can receive North Schleswig and the districts of Tondern, Hadersleben, Apenrade and Sonderburg in return for the guarantee of language rights for the German section of their populations. Norway and Sweden can obtain frontier improvements from Russia (not including the Aaland Islands) in the north and economically important cessions in the Polar zone."*

Thus the "Central European Confederation", as the power-hungry Pan-Germans modestly described their project for swallowing up the greater part of the European continent, was to reach from the North Cape to Baghdad, and the small States were to be forced to sell their neutrality on the cheap.

Norway was one of those countries whose "guaranteed neutrality" was denounced as futile. The reason was that her neutrality conflicted with imperialist Germany's desire for naval bases against Great Britain in the North Sea and for naval bases in the north for an attack on Russia.

Germany had similar plans for the Baltic. In Western Europe her chosen victims were Holland, Belgium and Northern France. In Northern and Eastern Europe they were Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Baltic area in general. All these territories were to be forced under German hegemony. A German, J. Ruedorffer, has given us a most appropriate description of the essence of German nationalism: "It lies in the nature of nationalism to push its claims further and further forward, and never to stop its advance. It is in essence insatiable. National unity does not satisfy it. It demands extension without limit or pause."

Unfortunately, not only Norway, but the world in general, did not pay sufficient attention to this Pan-German propaganda.

* Dr. A. Ritter, *Der organische Aufbau Europas*, Berlin, 1916.

When German militarism was defeated in 1918 Norway felt a great sense of relief. The policy of neutrality, maintained with such difficulty through over four years of war, had saved her from the worst. The dangers ahead seemed to have been abolished by the abdication of the bombastic, loud-mouthed Kaiser and the enforced retirement of the elements which had supported him, and after the war Norway, like all other Powers, had her hands too full with her own domestic problems to pay sufficient attention to the development which was proceeding behind the pseudo-democratic façade of the new German State.

V. NORWAY'S MATERIAL AND CULTURAL PROGRESS

1. ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

After the dissolution of the Union with Sweden in 1905, Norway made rapid economic and cultural progress. In 1905 the number of persons engaged in industry was 25 per cent greater than in 1897. By 1914 the increase was 87 per cent, and by 1917 112 per cent. The total h.p. used by Norwegian industry was 500 per cent greater in 1917 than in 1897, whilst in the mining industry it had increased by as much as 2,053 per cent.

This rapid industrial development was greatly facilitated by war-time conditions. Soon after the war, however, a period of sharp recession set in, and the country suffered from considerable unemployment. For several years Norway's economic life was convulsed by a crisis which was even more severe than that which was affecting Germany. A comparison between the percentage figures for unemployment in the two countries will show this:

Unemployment in Percentages of Trade Union Membership

YEAR	NORWAY	GERMANY
1921	17.6	2.8
1922	17.1	1.5
1923	10.6	10.2

However, the severe post-war economic crisis was finally overcome, and from 1924 to 1929 Norway's economic system enjoyed its share of the world-wide period of prosperity. The volume of h.p. employed in Norwegian industry rose from 701 million in 1925 to 1,052 million in 1930. The production of aluminium, which was 1,500 metric tons in 1913, rose to 22,000 metric tons in 1924 and to 27,000 metric tons in 1930. The production of copper, which was 2,700 metric tons in 1913, rose to 9,900 metric tons in 1924 and to 11,000 metric tons in 1925. However, by 1930 it had

dropped back again to 5,000 metric tons. There was a similar increase in the production of nickel. The production of nitrogen increased enormously, as the following figures show :

1913	.	.	.	15,000 tons
1925	.	.	.	20,000 "
1928	.	.	.	46,700 "
1930	.	.	.	85,900 "

Copper, nickel, aluminium, nitrogen and iron ore were all products for which Germany was to show an increasing interest and hunger in the coming years.

The violent economic recession which took place all over the world with the outbreak of the great economic crisis in 1929 also seriously affected Norwegian production. However, from about 1934 onwards things began to take a definite turn for the better again. A comparison of the economic development of Norway with that of Germany in the years after 1933 is interesting. It will be remembered that the National Socialist regime took credit upon itself for abolishing the crisis and its accompanying unemployment as a specifically Nazi achievement, although it was obvious that unemployment was liquidated by recruiting hundreds of thousands of young men into Hitler's private army, millions into the new German Army, and millions into the production of armaments. In Norway the situation was very different. Democracy remained in full force ; in fact, it was extended and strengthened. No one in Norway thought of preparations for war, and her industry was not even engaged in producing the arms needed to repel aggression. Nevertheless the index of production in Norway showed much the same picture as that of Germany.

Index of Industrial Production (1935=100)

YEAR	NORWAY	GERMANY
1931	73	72
1934	91	85
1935	100	100
1936	110	113
1937	120	124
1938	120	134

Only in the last year before the present war, when Germany was straining every nerve and mobilizing all her economic and industrial resources to put the last touches to her war preparations, did Germany's index of production make any noteworthy advance on that of Norway. Between 1930 and 1937 the total value of Norwegian production increased from 1,488 million crowns to

2,023 million crowns, or by approximately 40 per cent. Rather less than a third of the total population gainfully employed in Norway were employed in industry. Rather more than a third were engaged in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and about a fifth in commerce and shipping.

This very considerable economic development in Norway was accompanied by a rise in the standard of living of the population as a whole. According to the calculations of the Statistical Office in Oslo the weekly wages of workers increased by about 20 per cent between 1933 and 1938, whilst the wages of agricultural labourers increased even more in the same period. Although the actual increase in real wages was not as high as this owing to the fact that prices also increased in this period, there is nevertheless no doubt that real wages in 1938 were quite definitely higher than in 1933, and, above all, the standard of living of the Norwegian workers was considerably higher than that of the German workers under National Socialist rule. For instance, whilst social welfare expenditure was very considerably reduced in Nazi Germany, it was increased in Norway, and social legislation was considerably extended. Accident insurance, old-age pensions, labour protection and unemployment insurance were all introduced. Maternity and child welfare arrangements on a wide scale were also in process of introduction. In Oslo all schoolchildren received breakfast free, the institution which is known all over the world as "the Oslo Breakfast" for its health-giving qualities ; it consisted of milk, butter, bread, fruit and raw vegetables. In addition to this progress in the field of social welfare there was also considerable cultural progress. Norway had the honour of being the country with the lowest infant mortality rate in the world, and a high general standard of health amongst her population.

2. NORWAY A PRODUCER OF VITAL RAW MATERIALS.

The First World War not only underlined the strategic importance of Norway's coastline, but it also revealed the importance of Norway as a producer of important raw materials for the belligerent Powers. In these circumstances it is not surprising that Germany's rulers kept a watchful eye on Norway's economic and industrial progress and on the development of her agriculture. This interest was heightened by the fact that Norway's share in the production of quite a number of vital raw materials was increasing year by year.

For instance, by 1939 the Norwegian production of iron ore and sulphur pyrites had been increased to over a million tons annually. In consequence of its higher quality and its greater metal content Norwegian ore is much more valuable than that mined in Germany. The following table shows the production of iron ore in Norway and Germany respectively and the respective metal contents (in 1,000 metric tons) :

YEAR	NORWAY		GERMANY	
	Ore	Metal Content	Ore	Metal Content
1929 . . .	746	489	6,374	2,080
1935 . . .	765	497	6,044	1,849
1936 . . .	847	550	7,570	2,259
1937 . . .	1,065	692	9,792	2,759

These figures show that although in 1937 Germany mined more than nine times as much iron ore as Norway, the actual metal content of the German ore was only about four times as great as that of the Norwegian ore total; in other words, the metal content of Norwegian ore is about 70 per cent, whilst that of German ore is only 30.

Germany produced 415,000 tons of sulphur pyrites, an essential raw material for the chemical industry, in 1938, or only 40 per cent of Norway's production, which amounted to 1,028,000 tons.

In the production of copper Norway and Germany run each other very close, as the following figures (in metric tons) indicate:

YEAR	NORWAY	GERMANY
1929 . . .	19,000	29,100
1935 . . .	20,500	28,300
1936 . . .	22,600	28,000
1937 . . .	23,000	28,100

All these figures are taken from the *Statistical Year-Book of the League of Nations* for 1938, and the figures for Germany include those for Austria.

With regard to copper as well, Germany's production is inferior in quality to that of Norway. Further, Germany's production was quite inadequate to meet her requirements in copper in the event of war, and therefore those responsible for Germany's prosecution of the war were all the more interested in the increasing production of copper in Norway, particularly as the only other countries in Europe producing any large quantities of copper are Yugoslavia and Spain.

Another very important metallic raw material produced increasingly by Norway is molybdenum, which is of great importance for the hardening of steel and is needed for certain chemical products. The following figures show that Norway was rapidly increasing her production of this most important metal:

Production of Molybdenum

1929 . . .	106 metric tons
1935 . . .	388 „ „
1936 . . .	422 „ „
1937 . . .	360 „ „

Germany is unable to mine any molybdenum herself, and there is no other country producing that extremely valuable ore anywhere in Europe outside Norway.

The following figures allow a comparison between the respective shares of Norway and Germany in the world production of various metals:

Share of World Production in Percentages in 1938

	NORWAY	GERMANY
Copper ore . . .	1.1	1.5
Iron ore . . .	1.3	5.3
Magnesite . . .	0.2	0.2
Molybdenum ore . . .	2.8	—
Nickel ore . . .	1.1	—
Tungsten ore . . .	0.1	—
Pyrites . . .	9.8	4.0

Norway's comparatively more favourable position with regard to the production of important raw materials is enhanced when the respective population figures of the two countries are taken into consideration: 2.9 millions in Norway, 67 millions in Germany.

Another economic factor of great importance is Norway's predominant position in the whaling industry and the production of whale oil. Norway's whaling fleet is the largest in the world, and consists of 82 whalers and 14 floating factories for dealing with the catch on the spot. Norway's production of whale oil in 1937 was 1,192,000 tons as compared with a total of 3,210,000 tons produced by the rest of the world put together.

3. NORWAY'S MERCANTILE MARINE AND HER WORLD TRADE.

The Norwegian mercantile marine and Norway's world trade both made very rapid progress in the last quarter of a century, as the following figures show. (Tonnage all in 1,000 tons).

YEAR	STEAMERS Tonnage	MOTOR-SHIPS Tonnage	SAILING-SHIPS Tonnage	TOTAL Tonnage
1914 . . .	2,023	6	610	2,648
1918 . . .	1,499	113	280	1,892
1921 . . .	2,203	224	203	2,630
1930 . . .	2,403	465	15	3,883
1939 . . .	1,824	3,010	1	4,835

Thus in comparison with 1914 the tonnage had increased by 2,200,000 tons, or about 83 per cent. Not only that, but the reconstruction of the mercantile marine after the terrible losses suffered during the First World War made it the most modern mercantile marine in the world. About 50 per cent of the total Norwegian tonnage in 1939 was represented by ships which were less than ten years old, and whereas the number of motor-ships in 1914 was negligible, in 1939 they accounted for over 3 million tons out of a total of about 5 million tons, or almost 60 per cent. Only 22.8 per cent of Great Britain's mercantile marine consisted of motor-ships in 1938. In addition, certain specialized ships such as whale-oil factories and tankers represent an unusually high proportion of Norway's total tonnage, higher than in any other mercantile marine in the world.

The economic importance of Norway's mercantile marine can be seen from two facts. First of all, Norway owns 1,663 registered tons of merchant shipping to every 1,000 inhabitants, whereas in Germany the corresponding figure is only 60 registered tons. And secondly, before the war the gross earnings from Norwegian shipping amounted to 700-800 million crowns annually.

Another important fact is the increasing significance of Norway's mercantile marine in overseas trade as shown by her share in the figures of shipping passing through the great canals of the world since 1922:

Norwegian Tonnage in Percentage of Total Tonnage.

YEAR	KAISER-WILHELM CANAL	SUEZ CANAL	PANAMA CANAL
1922 . . .	9.3	1.4	3.4
1927 . . .	6.6	2.1	3.5
1930 . . .	5.6	2.9	5.3
1935 . . .	3.8	4.1	8.5
1937 . . .	3.7	4.5	11.1

Thus Norwegian tonnage passing through the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal steadily decreased, whilst Norwegian tonnage passing through the Suez and Panama Canals rapidly increased. These figures are also sufficient indication of the increasing importance of Norwegian shipping in the trade of the world.

In the twenty years between the two World Wars Norwegian foreign trade was affected by the general movements of world trade and by conditions on the world market. By 1933, at a time when world trade had sunk to its lowest level owing to the severe economic crisis which had affected the whole world, Norway's imports had fallen to 665 million crowns and her exports to 558 million crowns.

In the last few years before the outbreak of the Second World War her foreign trading figures were as follows (in million crowns):

YEAR	IMPORTS	EXPORTS
1936 . . .	927	685
1937 . . .	1,293	823
1938 . . .	1,193	787
1939 . . .	1,366	807

Although the import figure for 1939 indicates a certain stocking-up owing to the threatening political situation and the danger of war, nevertheless the development as a whole in these years shows relatively greater foreign trading activity than Germany can show for the same period.

Norway's trade with Germany was much less important than her trade with Great Britain. Between 1933 and 1938 Norway's imports from Germany increased in value from 139.4 million crowns to 206.1 million crowns, whilst her exports to Germany increased in the same period from 69.8 million to 121.5 million crowns. Throughout all these years Norway imported considerably more from Germany than she exported to Germany. Thus the balance of foreign trade between the two countries was definitely passive as far as Norway was concerned, and to her disadvantage.

On a yearly average during the last ten years before the outbreak of the present war between 12 and 13 per cent of Norway's total exports went to Germany. In 1938 the total value of these exports amounted to 121.5 million crowns, of which 33.3 million crowns was accounted for by payments for minerals, raw and half finished, 27.1 million crowns for metals raw and half worked, and 7.7 million crowns for finished goods from mineral raw materials. Thus 68.1 million crowns, or about 57 per cent of Norway's total exports to Germany, represented minerals and metals. Animal fats, oil, bones, horn, etc., accounted for 20.4 million crowns in the same year. *The preponderance of such materials indicates that Germany was using her imports from Norway primarily for war preparations.*

From 1910 onwards Norway's share in world trade steadily increased. In 1910 her percentage share amounted to 0.5. In 1926 it was 0.6 per cent, and by 1937 it had increased to 1 per cent. A comparison which takes into consideration the population figure and the size of the economic system would once again be in Norway's favour.

VI. NORWAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD PEACE

1. FOR A UNIVERSAL LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.

The artillery of the First World War was still spewing death and destruction when men and women were hard at work in Norway drawing up a scheme for international treaties guaranteeing permanent peace to the world after the end of the bloody conflict. The men who worked in this way as the representatives of the Norwegian people thoroughly justified the great honour done to their country more than twenty years ago when the Norwegian Storting was entrusted with the appointment of a committee to confer the Nobel Peace Prize. The other Nobel Prizes were conferred by Sweden.

The Versailles Treaty of 1919 provided for the foundation of a League of Nations. The League was intended to develop into a permanent and universal instrument for the prevention of new wars and the final consolidation of world peace. The people of Norway were well aware that the new world order which came into being after the First World War was very far from perfect in many respects, but on March 20, 1920, their Storting adopted the following motion with 100 against 20 votes:

"In conformity with its tradition the Storting rallies to the great conception on which the League of Nations is founded, and regards this institution as the most important attempt which has yet been made to establish justice in the relations between the peoples of the world. Whilst declaring that the future of the League of Nations depends in principle on a broadening of the basis of admission to include all civilized peoples, on a general reduction of armaments, and on the pacific settlement of all international disputes as a means of avoiding war, the Storting gives its consent to the adherence of Norway to the Covenant of the League of Nations."

The minority who did not vote for the motion in this form were the representatives of the Norwegian Labour Party, who were also in favour of the League of Nations idea but who demanded that the League should immediately be thrown open to all States with a view to consolidating peace, and wished to make this a condition of Norway's adherence to the Covenant. In addition they demanded that the Covenant should expressly condemn war as a means of national policy, establish the settlement of all such disputes by compulsory arbitration before an international court, and immediately take the necessary steps to secure general disarmament.

The very valuable work steadily carried on by Norway's representatives during fifteen years of League of Nations activities

cannot be described in detail here. Norway's first delegate to the League was none other than Fridtjof Nansen, of whom Lord Curzon once said: "He is the only living man to whom the doors of every Chancellery in Europe are flung wide open." The various relief actions which were carried out after the war to secure the speedy release of prisoners, to protect the interests of refugees and to alleviate the sufferings of the victims of famine in Russia, were mostly due to his initiative and carried out under his leadership.

The work of Norway's representatives in the League of Nations itself was primarily directed to securing the widest recognition of the principles of democracy in its organization and working. The Norwegian delegation was constantly pressing to secure recognition of the principle that the most important organ of the League was neither the League Council nor the League Secretariat, but the plenary meeting of the League of Nations itself at which all the member nations were directly represented by their delegates.

In November 1925 an agreement was signed between the Swedish and Norwegian Governments, at the initiative of the latter, according to which henceforward any disputes between the two Governments should be submitted unconditionally to international arbitration. The agreement expressly excluded any reservations whatever, and all questions without exception, whether they were what is usually known as questions affecting national honour, national independence or any other vital interests, questions relating to domestic matters or questions referring to past disputes, were all to be referred for final settlement to an international court of arbitration, whose decision was to be accepted unconditionally by both parties. Unfortunately, the other European States showed no inclination to follow this splendid example of how to settle international disputes without recourse to war.

A Pact outlawing war, proposed by the United States representative, Kellogg, was signed by almost all the nations of the world in 1929; the Pact was unreservedly ratified by Norway. Numerous other Governments also ratified it, but with reservations which greatly diminished its practical value. At the same time the Norwegian Government considered it necessary to point out formally that the Kellogg Pact "included no positive obligation or procedure for the pacific settlement of disputes".

The Norwegian Delegation to the League of Nations always enjoyed the firm support of the Norwegian people, who were determined to do everything in their power to maintain the peace of the world, and it worked tirelessly to close all gaps in the bulwark which was being erected against the outbreak of future war. It regarded militarism, even without aggressive armaments, as a latent danger to the cause of world peace, and demanded general disarmament as the only means of successfully consolidating the peace of the world. It regarded the conclusion of an all-round collective alliance and compulsory international arbitration for all inter-

national disputes, without exception, as the only really effective guarantee of world security. On the other hand, it was suspicious of military sanctions, and it condemned the idea of preventive wars.

The Locarno Pact, which was widely publicized both by amateur and professional politicians in the bigger countries of Europe as the beginning of a new epoch of world peace, was received more soberly and even critically in Norway. Norway's delegate to the League of Nations criticized the Pact in the League of Nations Assembly in September 1926 as follows: "The essential point was that disputes not deemed suitable for judicial settlement under the Locarno Pact would, in the event of the failure of conciliation, be laid before the League Council (for consideration only, and not necessarily for settlement) and not before a court of arbitration appointed with respect to the qualification of its members as arbiters."

One respect in which the Locarno Pact differed fundamentally from the agreement signed between the Swedish and Norwegian Governments was that the German Government deliberately signed the Pact not with the intention of making a contribution to the peace of Europe, but with the firm determination to use the Pact as an instrument of Germany's foreign policy, which aimed at establishing an overwhelmingly preponderant position for her in Europe. The signing of the Locarno Pact by Germany meant nothing more than the opening up of a new stage in Germany's preparations for a war of revenge.

2. RESERVATIONS AGAINST SANCTIONS.

With the victory of the National Socialist and militarist reaction in Germany in 1933 the efforts to secure the settlement of all disputes by international arbitration, and thus safeguard the peace of Europe, had obviously broken down completely. However, Norway continued her efforts within the framework of the League of Nations.

When Mussolini attacked Abyssinia in the summer of 1935 a joint conference of the Foreign Secretaries of all Scandinavian countries met and expressed the hope "that this conflict will be handled in accordance with the provisions of the League Covenant", and declared that "they will support every effort to guard the peace and maintain the principles of the League of Nations". The League of Nations did actually declare economic sanctions against the aggressor, but it was done too late and too half-heartedly. The Norwegian Government accepted without reservation all the obligations imposed on it by its membership of the League of Nations. It issued an embargo on the export to Italy of all the commodities included in the League's sanctions, although to do so meant serious damage to its own export interests. However, it gladly shouldered this burden in order to assist the League action against the Fascist aggressor, and it was certainly no fault of Norway that the action ended in a decisive defeat of the League.

In July 1936, after the raising of League sanctions against Italy, the Foreign Minister of those countries which had remained neutral in the First World War—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Switzerland, Holland and Finland—issued a joint declaration which subsequently took on fundamental importance in their foreign-political relations. It declared, amongst other things: "As it has now become evident that the League of Nations is unable or unwilling to maintain a consistent system of action against all cases of aggression or the violation of national rights, the undersigned nations cannot regard themselves as any further obliged to participate in such actions, and they will not do so except by their own freely taken decision in each individual case."

The passivity of the League of Nations when Japan seized Manchuria and attacked China and the tragi-comedy of the non-intervention policy when the Fascist Powers joined in the Spanish civil war on the side of Franco against democratic republican Spain represented new fiascos for the League of Nations and the defeat of the principles on which it was originally founded. Shortly after that Germany and Italy openly began to lay the axe to the roots of world peace. First there was the forcible annexation of Austria by Germany, and then the occupation of Albania by Italy. The League of Nations and the Great Powers watched these crimes without interfering.

It was clear to all the small States that the League of Nations would not protect them from aggression if any Great Power attacked them. Like many other countries, Norway was compelled to review her position and decide whether the existing international obligations offered her sufficient guarantee of her continued neutrality in the event of European war. On May 31, 1938, the Norwegian Storting adopted a motion declaring: "In accordance with the declaration from the Throne that Norway's foreign policy must always aim at keeping the country free of foreign political conflicts, the Storting maintains Norway's right to maintain complete and unconditional neutrality in all wars which she does not herself recognize as League of Nations actions."

A few weeks later, when Germany had begun her preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia, a meeting of Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden issued a declaration dissociating their countries from the system of sanctions adopted by the League of Nations:

"Being firmly convinced that their countries should continue to co-operate in the work of the League of Nations, they declare that their governments will maintain their attitude of regarding the system of sanctions under present conditions and in view of the practical experiences of recent years as being non-obligatory. They are further of the opinion that this non-obligatory character should apply not merely to any particular group of

States, but to all the members of the League of Nations. They are of the opinion that it is in the best interests of the League that there should be express recognition of this right to accept or reject the system of sanctions. . . . They are desirous that the League of Nations should continue and intensify its work to prevent international conflicts and to bring about international co-operation."

In view of everything that had gone before it cannot be said that the declaration did anything to weaken the League of Nations. It was not this declaration which brought the sanctions system of the League to an end, but the unfortunate experience of its practical application at the time of Italy's attack on Abyssinia, which showed clearly that the League of Nations in its existing form was unable to impose sanctions successfully. All the declaration did was to draw the obvious conclusions from obvious facts, and at the same time it expressed the desire of the smaller nations to protect themselves and maintain their neutrality. This political action was accompanied by measures to extend and strengthen Norway's defensive arrangements. If possibilities had existed of the League of Nations once again developing into an efficient instrument for peaceably regulating the relations between the peoples, then Norway's foreign policy was calculated to further and support such possibilities. However, by the summer of 1938 there was no further hope of that.

VII. GERMAN AGGRESSION BEHIND THE PSEUDO-DEMOCRATIC FAÇADE

1. THE LUST FOR POWER UNBROKEN.

We have seen the real relation of imperial Germany to Norway and become acquainted with the strategic plans and theories on which this relation was based. What was the situation when imperial Germany disappeared and its place was taken by the Weimar Republic, whose Constitution began with the pregnant words: "Political power proceeds from the people"? As soon as the representatives of the ruling system which collapsed for a while after the defeat of the German Army in 1918 got together again in the Weimar Republic to restore their power and influence, Germany's aggressive plans against her neighbours, and in particular against Norway, were taken up again where imperial Germany was compelled to lay them down. The rebuilding of the German Navy began in the summer of 1919.

General von Seeckt, who was the leader of the Republican Reichswehr from 1920 to 1927, declared: "It is indeed no easy

matter to conduct Germany's foreign policy in these days, but at least there need be no doubt about the final objective: *it is the re-establishment of Germany as a power in the world.*"

The old lust for power was unbroken, and its ideology remained in full force. Other countries were not entirely unaware of this, including Norway, but the sympathies of the democratic people of Norway were now on the whole with the defeated country, and in particular they felt unbounded confidence in the democratic spirit of the German working class and of the German Socialist movement. The people of Norway did not realize that the old Pan-German plans of conquest and aggression were still cherished in the political and military circles of the Republic, or that Germany's schools were still hotbeds of nationalism deliberately cultivating a spirit of arrogant aggression, the old spirit of the "*Herrenvolk*".

Even before the First World War had ended Germany was preparing to spread her influence over the world after the conclusion of peace. Writing in August 1917, the *Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten* declared: "The representatives of German industry and German labour must not regard themselves as representatives of any particular firm, but as servants of the German national idea, and they must perform their tasks as propaganda to enhance the prestige of the German cause. . . . A whole army of such propagandists will be necessary. . . . This army must be provided by Germany's trade itself. It is no longer a question of representing German private interests. We must organize universal economic service to reconquer in peaceful competition with other countries the markets we have lost during the war. That will not be an easy task, and we shall be able to carry it out only if we use all our strength and all the forces at our command. . . ."

Even then Germany's imperialists enjoyed a long experience in peaceful economic penetration of foreign countries and in the extension of Germany's economic power far beyond her own frontiers. Norway was one of the countries in which this tactic was employed. As early as 1904 German capital investments in Norway totalled 35 million marks. The most successful coup brought off by the Germans in this respect in the years before the Second World War was when the I. G. Farben, the leading German chemical firm, got a hold on Norsk Hydro Electrical Kvelstoff, a big modern chemical undertaking in Norway. In 1927 the financial difficulties of this firm were exploited by German interests and it was brought under the influence of I. G. Farben. The share capital of the undertaking was increased from £1,050,000 to £4,300,000, and the greater part of the increased share capital was secured by I. G. Farben, together with representation on the Board of Directors. Only a few weeks before Germany's treacherous attack on Norway a German capitalist group had obtained permission to build a fish-canning factory on the Norwegian coast.

2. AN ARMY OF SPIES AND PROPAGANDISTS.

Following on the heels of German capital investments came German directors, engineers, technicians, fitters, workers, commercial travellers, etc. They came as members of that "army of propagandists" whose aim was "to enhance the prestige of the German cause". This mass import of Germans into Norway was carried on as rapidly as possible in view of the fact that otherwise German influence was negligible. Norway had no minority problems. On December 1, 1930, there were only 2,227 Germans amongst a total population of almost 2.9 million souls. The supply of agents and propagandists had therefore to be provided artificially by importing them from outside. Without these spies Germany would not have been able to obtain the necessary local knowledge for her subsequent plans of aggression, or to prepare the way for their performance.

Germany's efforts to obtain influence in Norway were not confined to the economic field. The German Embassy, which later sank to the level of a mere espionage centre, was extremely active in "furthering the German cause abroad". The German Navy also had its task and its appointed role in the plans for aggression against Norway, and it was well represented in the preliminary "propaganda". Every year it sent a number of its ships on "summer cruises" to Norway, visiting the important fiords and harbours. The German *Marine Rundschau*, July 1924, was very satisfied with the results of these cruises and reported that their effect both on the German colonies in Norway and on the prestige of Germany and the German Navy in Norway was excellent. Of course, these visits were presented as perfectly friendly to Norway and perfectly harmless, but one of Germany's naval captains was franker: "Of course, the main aim of these cruises is quite different. A navy which is not at home on the high seas, which always operates close to the shore, and leaves the safety of harbour only very occasionally for manœuvres, is not really a navy at all, but an expensive toy, and one that our impoverished Fatherland could not afford."

The ships which manœuvred in and out of the Norwegian fiords and round the Norwegian islands every summer, and held exercises, were manned by crews who were prepared for their future tasks by the War Minister of the German Republic, General Groener, in the following fashion: "We older men can do no more than plant a seed in your young souls, in your young hearts, in your young heads, and then hope—yes, not only hope, but be quite certain—that the seed will grow and flourish and one day bear fruit. Or, if I may use a different metaphor, we can light a holy fire in your hearts and exhort you to keep this fire burning and to let it leap up into fierce flames when the Fatherland calls. It is up to the youth to lead Germany forwards and upwards, and it is our unshakable conviction that it will do everything possible to perform this task."

The youngsters gathered to be apostrophized in this way knew perfectly well what Groener meant by leading Germany "forwards and upwards"; they knew that preparations were under way for war, and that they were to fight to make Germany a great power in the world again.

Another favourite means of propaganda for "the German idea" was the holiday tours arranged by big German shipping companies to Norway, Svalbard and Iceland. The departure and arrival of these holiday cruise ships were invariably made the occasion for organized nationalist demonstrations in which the population of the harbour towns joined either as active participants or passive spectators. In September 1925 a film entitled "The North Pole Glow" was shown in Berlin. In the accompanying lecture to the audience the pro-German attitude of the Icelanders was praised to the skies, and as a proof of it the audience was informed that a party of Icelanders visiting the pleasure steamer *Muenchen* had sung "The Watch on the Rhine" in honour of the German passengers. This touching scene had been specially photographed.

When the Nazis came to power and organized their *Kraft durch Freude* cruises to Norway in the years 1934-39 they were merely continuing on a rather wider scale the propaganda and espionage activities already begun in Norway by the military authorities and "private" organizations under the Weimar Republic.

The film played a big part in Germany's propaganda. Since 1923 there was something like a film invasion of Norway ("S O S Iceberg"). The Germans hoped to persuade the Norwegian people that their only motive was a warm interest in them and their culture, but their real aim was to make widespread camera reconnaissance without awakening suspicion. The nationalist and militarist organizers of these film expeditions had every reason to be satisfied with the results of their "cultural film expeditions".

Another very valuable weapon of German propaganda in Norway was the so-called *wienerbarna*, the Children of Vienna. In the first years after the First World War, when distress in Vienna was terrible, hundreds of children were welcomed in Norway and lovingly cared for by Norwegian foster-parents. After these children had returned home the friendliest relations were maintained between them and their Norwegian hosts. Today these children are between 25 and 30 years old. They became active propagandists on behalf of National Socialist Germany. Long before Austria was forcibly seized by Germany the so-called Scandinavian Club in Vienna, the club of the *wienerbarna*, was a centre of German Nationalism and National Socialism. When the forcible annexation took place these "Scandinavian" Vienna Nazis willingly let themselves be used as spies against Norway under the hypocritical cloak of their "love for Norway". They wrote systematically to their former foster-parents and friends in Norway praising conditions in Germany and Austria under Nazi

rule, and putting all sorts of pertinent questions concerning conditions in Norway. The knowledge gained in this way and during their stay in Norway was readily placed at the disposal of the Nazis, and subsequently these "Children of Vienna" took a leading part in the German invasion.

3. "CULTURAL BONDS".

From time to time the Pan-Germans have attempted to give their aggressive plans against the Scandinavian peoples some semblance of justification with theories of blood and race. It is rather more difficult to declare simply that the Norwegians are Germans, as the Germans do with the Swiss, for instance. However, they are a Germanic people at least! At the same time they need looking after. Hear what Professor Banse has to say about them sorrowfully: "They reveal a tendency to weakness and flabby aestheticism, and a very definite leaning to materialism. . . . These Germans go soft in their corporate and personal lives as soon as the Prussian drill-sergeant . . . no longer maintains discipline in military matters. . . . Whoever has seen Danish, Swedish, or even Norwegian soldiers knows that without outside intervention these three peoples will never experience their national rebirth."

Banse, a Professor of the Weimar Republic, wrote that in 1932. The theory is clear: it is Germany's right, even her duty, as the one and only original *Herrenvolk*, to take these weaker brothers under her wing and educate them up to cultural, political and racial standards worthy of their Germanic origin. Let there be no doubt about it, this claptrap was taken very seriously, and in the twenty-odd years which preceded the present World War Germany was very busy preparing herself for the onerous task. Official and commercial relations with Norway were deliberately misused by Germany to further her "intellectual and cultural" influence, although there were no "Germans Abroad" in Norway. The *Deutsch-Nordische Gesellschaft* and the *Deutsch-Norwegische Gesellschaft* in Germany were used as instruments of this German nationalist propaganda in Norway. A number of cultural institutions and associations devoted their activities to the cultural conquest of Norway and to bringing the country within Germany's orbit. The most important of these institutions were the "Nordic Society" in Luebeck and the "Nordic Universities Institute" in Kiel and Greifswald, whose activities were subsidized by the German Government. Organized exchanges of professors and students and joint German-Norwegian conferences were arranged, ostensibly in the interests of science and culture, but actually in support of German propaganda. Other societies, organizations, newspapers and private persons were active in the same direction. Norwegian students were invited to spend their holidays in Germany, and as the German language was a compulsory subject at

all Norwegian higher schools, the young men and women had no language difficulties to cope with.

Amongst the newspapers and magazines which worked in the service of Germany's Nordic propaganda, and sought to harness Norway into what was called "German-Nordic co-operation", was the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*, whose influence was strong in all German political parties. There is no doubt that this body did great service to the German power politicians in the years between 1925 and the outbreak of the war, and in particular it provided them with excellent camouflage for their activities.

The "cultural bonds" which allegedly unite the two peoples were also misused by Germany to win the confidence of the Norwegian people. Norway's pioneering activities in Arctic exploration are widely known, and the names of Nansen and Amundsen are internationally famous. Daring flights of discovery and scientific research were made by Norwegians and much valuable data was brought back from the Arctic regions. Germany's Army and Air Force leaders, who began their work secretly as early as the twenties, reckoned on securing the support of the Norwegians in this sphere of military flying. Between 1923 and 1938 a whole series of German Arctic flights were organized with the double aim of propaganda and reconnaissance. The first flight of Mittelholzer (a Swiss) and Wegener was in 1923. It was conducted without any serious scientific preparation, but it produced valuable results for its organizers, who were interested in something more (or less) than purely scientific discovery. Practical tests were made of the conditions under which aeroplanes would have to fly in the Arctic in the event of war. North Pole and Arctic research in the interests of science again provided the camouflage for the widely heralded nationalist propaganda flight of Eckener's Zeppelin in 1925. Collections were made throughout Germany to finance the expedition, and masses of people contributed their coppers to assist "the great scientific flight to the North Pole". In reality, the flight was undertaken to test various new inventions, to adapt the lighter-than-air construction to modern aeronautical technical progress, to give the builders, technicians and other airship experts the opportunity of working under campaign conditions and to determine the significance of the lighter-than-air construction in the general *Luftwaffe* development programme. Once again "scientific and cultural research" was used as a camouflage for Germany's systematic war preparations.

The Germans must be given what credit there is for having recognized more clearly than anyone else the supreme importance of the air arm in modern warfare, and from 1920 onwards they worked systematically to give their country air superiority. The experience gained by German pilots in their constant flights over Norwegian territory, over and through the Norwegian fiords, over the mountains of Norway and Svalbard and over the Arctic regions

could never have been obtained within Germany's frontiers over her mountains and landlocked lakes, or even over the Alps. And for the German pilots there was no better opportunity of studying the highly developed meteorological service run by the Norwegian Government.

Further, the air ports for the regular air service from Germany over Greenland to North America were to be in Norway and Iceland. Iceland was reckoned to have been brought so thoroughly under German influence that in the event of war Germany would be able to take all the strategic landing-fields she needed for the *Luftwaffe*. What favourable prospects opened up for Germany once she had the decisive strategic points for the Europe-America air line in her hands!

There is no doubt whatever today that all this loudly trumpeted German-Norwegian cultural and scientific co-operation had, as far as the Germans were concerned, very little to do with culture and science. An excellent practical example of the truth of this was seen when Amundsen set out to organize his Arctic expedition in 1926. When he appealed to Germany for financial support one would have thought that all the various German organizations and institutions whose ostensible aim was to further German-Norwegian cultural and scientific co-operation would have sprung to his assistance and done everything possible to make a tremendous success of his lecture tour in Germany. However, this time it really was scientific investigation which was at stake, and they were therefore not interested, so that when the great Polar explorer came to Germany he was shown the cold shoulder and his lecture tour was boycotted. When he lectured in Hanover he faced audiences of a few score in halls which held two and three thousand people. The result was that the financial yield of the tour was practically negligible.

The ostensible reason for the boycott is also highly interesting. When, in 1917, Germany declared unrestricted submarine warfare and sank the merchant ships of neutral countries without warning, Amundsen returned all his German decorations as a protest against the cold-blooded murder of his unarmed fellow-countrymen by Germany's submarine heroes. This generous action was too much for Germany's patriots to stomach, and they bore Amundsen a bitter grudge which did him all credit. The Weimar Republic took a mean vengeance on Amundsen for this manly protest against the cowardly and murderous activities of imperial Germany. As Admiral Riiser-Larsen pointed out in the *Norsk Tidend* years later: "Germans are the same whether their leader is a Kaiser, a President or a Fuehrer." It was a long and bitter lesson, ruthlessly hammered home for Norway.

The agents of "the German national idea" were well trained, and they carried out their tasks unscrupulously, whether they came to Norway as engineers, fish-buyers, journalists or flyers. And always their camouflage was the same—all of them were loyally furthering German-Norwegian scientific and cultural co-operation.

4. "DENMARK IS IN OUR WAY; THE NORWEGIAN POSITION WOULD BE BETTER STILL!"

In the twenty years' pause between the First World War and the Second, Germany's geo-political experts and her naval strategists worked ceaselessly to perfect their plans for aggression against Norway and Denmark. Their aim was to prepare the way for the day on which a new, great and, they hoped, successful attempt would be made to establish Germany as the ruler of Europe and the world. The principle according to which the Weimar Republic conducted its less open aggression was the same as that of imperial Germany before it. Germany, argued the Pan-German theorists and naval strategists, is a commercial and maritime State. As a result of her unfavourable geographical situation she is deprived of suitable outlets to the sea. The outlet to the North Sea and beyond is blocked by Great Britain, Norway and Denmark, whilst Denmark also blocks the entrance to the Baltic. Denmark consists of a large peninsula and innumerable large and small islands, and the nation which inhabits it automatically controls the outlet to the high seas for the greater part of Germany. Thus Denmark is in Germany's way, and it was necessary to build a great canal at enormous cost to relieve the pressure even a little. In future wars, they argued, Germany could not stand by passively and see the Danish belt giving protection to the British fleet in the North Sea. In the future Germany would not be able to respect the neutrality of small States at the price of losing strategic positions which would facilitate her naval struggle against Great Britain and Russia.

Thus the German strategic offensive plan required the opening of the Danish belt and an understanding with Denmark concerning the use of her waters and the control of the northern trade routes. Germany could obtain the key to the Baltic by political arrangements with Denmark. The Sund and the Belt would then be protected from the north, and the Baltic would be safe against British attack. Relieved from anxiety in the Baltic, at least as far as Great Britain was concerned, the German fleet would be free to turn its attention to the North Sea. At the same time Germany would secure control of the northern trade route and thus obtain a means of exerting pressure on Norway and Denmark. That would mean an increase of power and political influence and, in addition, an increase in national prestige. The German fleet in the Kattegat would mean a threat to Great Britain's position, and open up further possibilities for Germany in the Atlantic.

Germany ought not to lose such promising chances merely in order that the neutrality of Norway and Denmark might be respected. In the First World War she had to pay heavily for her over-scrupulous respect for the rights of small nations, and she owed it to herself not to risk such consequences a second time. In any case, the Danes would understand because they were, after

all, the nearest relatives of the German people in the great Germanic family.

But supposing the Danish people failed to demonstrate sufficient amicable understanding—what then? Supposing they showed themselves “inclined from the beginning towards the enemy”—what then? After all, during the First World War Denmark sealed her frontiers against Germany and by her doubtful attitude caused the retention of troops and generally compelled Germany to ceaseless vigilance. In addition, she assisted Great Britain by placing tonnage at her disposal.

Yes, there was no doubt about it, Germany's naval strategists found Denmark in the way, and the fact that Danish shipping also assisted Germany by bringing meat, butter, cheese and milk to Germany was not taken into account in the reckoning. The arguments of Germany's theorizing professors in favour of violating the neutrality and destroying the national independence of a small country ignored everything which might point in the other direction.

“It is such a pity,” sighed Banse, “that this efficient and capable little people, our nearest relatives in the great Germanic family of peoples, should be so estranged from us. The best and most natural thing would be if Denmark—whilst maintaining her national independence, of course—were to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the German Reich, because—and these are the all-important points—first of all the use of her coasts and territorial waters would mean the command of the North Sea and the Baltic for us, and secondly, her highly developed agricultural and cattle-breeding activities would represent a very valuable complement to our own economic independence in the event of war.”

The role of Denmark in all Germany's strategic offensive plans is that of “friend and ally”—read: vassal—of Germany. A certain breadth of outlook cannot be denied to these naval strategists of the German Republic. Denmark is merely the figure in the foreground. Their plans went much farther than that. The next stage on the route mapped out was the south of Norway. In possession of Danish and Norwegian territorial waters it would not have been so easy for the enemy to observe the movements of the German fleet. And what a difference the possession of the Belt would have made to the Eastern Front! What a difference it would have made to the war with Russia if Germany had been able to stop the transport of materials over the Scandinavian peninsula and through the Arctic to Russia! In addition, with German troops and German naval forces in occupation of Norway the neutral Powers would never have given Great Britain their shipping space so willingly, nor would they have tolerated Great Britain's breaches of their neutrality so patiently, or protested so sharply against the unrestricted submarine campaign.

It is quite clear that Germany's naval strategists were not

satisfied with the idea of seizing Denmark alone. They wanted Norway as well, and before long they were writing openly that Norway in German hands or under German control would be better still for German aims. There is no holding Germany's power strategists; from one position they leap on to the next: “From the Norwegian position we should have to leap over the North Sea to carry our theory of strategic offensive to its logical conclusion. We should have to seize and consolidate some such geographical point as the Shetlands.”

And as soon as that leap was successfully accomplished the next had to be taken. “Only from the heights of grand strategy could Norway and Denmark be seen as in the centre point of events.” Great Britain would no longer be in a position to hold the blockade line, and when Germany's leap over the North Sea was successful and the struggle for the door to the Atlantic ended in Germany's favour, then the blockade would be broken altogether.

All this was criticism of Germany's prosecution of naval warfare in 1914–18, but within it was developing the practical strategic plan of the present World War as seen from Germany's angle. It was by no means mere theory, and under the protection of the Republican Reichswehr Ministry the theories of these naval strategists were made part and parcel of the training given to naval cadets at the Marine Academy in Mürwick-Flensburg, which was developed into a first-class invasion port long before 1933. The “offensive operations plan” which was actually carried out against Norway in 1940 was fundamentally in accordance with the strategic plans of the Republican Admirals and naval experts of the Weimar Republic.

And to clear up all doubt as to what was to be done next time, here is the German *Marine-Rundschau* writing in 1926: “Even before the war the danger zone of the northern sea route should have been safeguarded by an agreement with Norway and Denmark, and this policy would have had a good chance of success, seeing that it could have been supported by quite considerable sea power. Incidentally, the repeated visits of many German warships to Norwegian harbours should have been sufficient to convince anyone used to thinking in terms of sea power and sea strategy that this was their aim. As harmless as the visits were made, warships never lose their character as political instruments of national policy. Germany should have created a chain of strong-points over Norway and Denmark for an attack on the northern danger zone, extending if possible to the Faroes.”

The repeated demonstrations of German sea power in Danish and Norwegian waters were a thinly veiled demand that these two countries should abandon their neutrality and subordinate themselves to Germany's war aims. From 1922 onwards German warships appeared every year in Norway's fiords and harbours on manœuvres camouflaged as “holiday cruises”. The Norwegian

Government refused to let its foreign policy be influenced by these half-veiled threats, and this is no doubt the reason why Germany's disappointed naval strategists persistently contended that during the First World War Norway was one of the chief helpers of Great Britain, first of all because her south-west coast served the British fleet as a flank for the blockade across the North Sea from the Orkneys, secondly because her powerful mercantile marine kept Great Britain supplied with foodstuffs and raw materials, thirdly because Norway's northern harbour Narvik assisted in the supply of important war materials for Russia, and fourthly, because Norway did nothing to facilitate Germany's own supplies.

As we have demonstrated, facts are ignored and truth falsified in the campaign to prepare the German people psychologically for aggression against the neutral northern States. We have seen from the development of German-Norwegian trade, documented in the German-Norwegian trade agreement of 1917, and from the statements of Germany's imperial rulers, that during the whole of the First World War Norway supplied Germany with foodstuffs, and important war materials such as nickel, copper and iron and other metal ores. Not only the rulers of imperialist Germany, but also the rulers of the democratic Weimar Republic after them, were imbued with the idea that the German people were called by God to a higher fate than that of living peaceably with other peoples and enjoying the same rights as they enjoyed. In consequence of this belief the naval strategists of the Weimar Republic continued to prepare offensive plans and make everything ready for the outbreak of the next World War. The great majority of Germans readily supported these people and finally submitted to them absolutely.

All this took place under the direction of the Republican Reichswehr Ministry, and with the knowledge and consent of the highest republican authorities. In fact, these authorities took an active part in the preparations. And it was all going on behind the scenes at a time when officially Germany had entered the League of Nations and placed her signature on the Locarno Pact, recognizing her frontiers with France as permanently settled, and undertaking never to go to war with France again. Before the footlights in the centre of the stage, Germany was officially playing the part of an angel of peace bearing the olive branch of friendship and conciliation. Germany's Foreign Minister, Dr. Stresemann, even received the Nobel Prize for Peace for his part in the treacherous double game Germany was playing. The peoples of Europe have paid for their good faith and credulity with years of war and a holocaust of victims, and they are still paying.

VIII. THE GANGSTER AND HIS VICTIMS

1. "YOU'RE NOT FRIGHTENED OF ME, SURELY?"

A direct line leads from these naval strategical theories of the allegedly peaceful Weimar Republic through the military and economic rearmament of Germany in the years 1920-1932 to the final preparations for war under Hitler and the sudden onslaught on the peoples of Europe. Part and parcel of these careful preparations were the thorough investigations and manoeuvres carried out by the German fleet in Norwegian waters. The following is an account written by a Swedish historian, Per Nystroem, in the Goeteborg *Handels- och Sjöfartstidning* on July 1, 1940:

"By the autumn of 1936 preparations were so far under way that the German War Minister of the day, General von Blomberg, considered the moment opportune for investigating the possibilities of seizing the requisite *points d'appui* on the spot, i.e. in the Norwegian fiords and in Norwegian territorial waters. He thereupon requested the Norwegian authorities to grant him permission to take a holiday cruise—so he termed it—with the yacht *Grille* in Norwegian waters in October, although the autumnal gales had already set in. He provided the Norwegian Government with a list of places he wished to visit, and in accordance with international courtesy he received permission to do so. He went on his tour accompanied by a suite of about twenty military and naval personages. The cruise attracted a certain amount of attention subsequently owing to the fact that the *Grille* unexpectedly entered Narvik harbour. It had no permission to do so, and von Blomberg had not asked permission."

Nystroem points out that German cruisers and destroyers were constantly visiting Norwegian territorial waters in the spring and summer of 1937 without having obtained permission from the Norwegian authorities. By this time these cruises were no longer camouflaged as "holidays". In March 1938 the cruiser *Koeln* entered Aalesund alleging an "emergency", and shortly afterwards the cruiser *Leipzig* set a course northwards hugging the Norwegian coast, also without permission and without a Norwegian pilot on board. Nystroem writes: "When the Norwegian Government protested against this visit without permission the German Government declared that the *Leipzig* had gone to the assistance of the *Koeln*, although the German Admiralty and the commander of the *Leipzig* were well aware that by that time the *Koeln* had left Aalesund under her own steam and in a completely seaworthy condition." These plain demonstrations of Germany's aggressive intentions were made at a time when preparations were in full swing to seize Austria, invade Czechoslovakia and attack Poland.

After the German Government had torn up the Munich Agree-

ment and seized the whole territory of Czechoslovakia it covered its preparations for the next attack on its neighbours by a diplomatic interlude during which an attempt was made to draw Norway over to Germany's side. Although it had just demonstrated beyond all doubt that its word was utterly worthless, that solemn agreements were mere scraps of paper immediately they stood in the way of German interests, and that the habitual methods of German diplomacy were deceit and treachery, the German Government made an offer to a number of small States in the spring of 1939 to sign a pact of non-aggression with Germany. The aim of this clumsy manoeuvre was to forestall a great diplomatic and moral action on the part of President Roosevelt of the United States to curb German aggression and prevent the threatening war.

The Norwegian Government was not deceived for one moment, and it realized that such a non-aggression pact would not increase the security of its country against German aggression by one iota. The soundness of its political judgment was later confirmed by the fate of Denmark, which did sign the pact of non-aggression offered to her by Germany and subsequently fell victim to German aggression equally with Norway when the Germans considered the moment suitable. Together with Sweden and Finland the Norwegian Government rejected the offer, observing that there was no danger of any attack on Germany on their part and that in view of the existing guarantees they could hardly believe that any danger threatened them from Germany. Thus the diplomatic arts of the aggressor did not succeed in persuading the future victims of the aggression to come to the slaughter-house voluntarily, and the gangsters had to continue their game.

2. ORES, FISH AND SHIPPING.

With her unprovoked attack on Poland, Germany loaded the exclusive guilt for the outbreak of the Second World War on her shoulders. The criminals had often boasted of their great success in making their country economically self-sufficient, but on the day of the outbreak of war they sent their representatives to the Norwegian Government to secure the conclusion of a new trading agreement which would make Norway's economic resources and reserves available to Germany. This in itself was quite sufficient warning that Norway lay dangerously close to the arena of conflict.

Of course, immediately after the outbreak of war the German Government hastened to assure Norway that her neutrality would be respected, and its representatives arrived in Oslo quite prepared to sign a hundred and one documents to that effect providing the Norwegian Government was prepared to grant Germany a privileged trading position in exchange. However, all Germany's representatives could get out of the Norwegian Government was a promise that Norway would do her best to maintain her trading relations with Germany at their previous level, though what Germany wanted

was more than she had ever had before. The conclusion of a new trading agreement was promised for the future. The negotiations began soon afterwards, and in February 1940 the agreement was signed. It guaranteed Germany a share of Norway's own production of ores (iron, copper, nickel and tin) and the supply of large quantities of fish.

At the time this agreement was signed the preparations for the invasion of Norway were already nearing completion. Of course, as usual, the Germans had their excuses ready to justify their crime, and they followed the usual principle of blaming the victim for the aggression. A week or so before the actual invasion, at a time when all preparations for the attack must have been completed, Germany accused Norway of breaches of neutrality, and the shipping agreement signed by the Norwegian Shipping Association with Great Britain for chartering Norwegian ships was quoted in support of these charges. Now, for many years Norwegian ships had been working under charter in British service, and all the new agreement did was to extend the system to include two-fifths of Norway's tonnage. At the time of the agreement information was supplied to the German Ambassador concerning its purport, but no German protest was made. Indeed, there is no basis in International Law for any protest, because it is open to all neutral countries to lend their ships by charter to belligerent countries if they wish. On the other hand, International Law certainly does protect neutral ships sailing the high seas on their lawful occasions, and this law was ruthlessly violated by Germany.

3. AGGRESSION BEFORE THE INVASION.

A year before the outbreak of war the Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, Danish and Icelandic Governments announced the neutrality provisions which would come into effect in their waters in the event of war. Needless to say, from the very opening of hostilities Germany systematically violated these neutrality provisions, which were based strictly on the provisions of The Hague Convention of 1907. German submarines used Norwegian territorial waters for preparing their attacks on British, Swedish and even Norwegian vessels. The Germans seized the United States vessel *City of Flint* in defiance of International Law—at that time the United States was a neutral Power—and attempted to take it back to Germany through Norwegian waters. However, they were not successful in this, and when the vessel put into a Norwegian port the authorities seized the vessel, returned it to the United States authorities, and interned the German crew.

Loaded with several hundred British prisoners, the German auxiliary cruiser *Altmark* made its way down the coast of Norway on its way home to Germany. When the Norwegian control officer asked the captain of the *Altmark* whether any passengers were on board or any other person apart from her declared crew,

the *Herrenvolk* hero answered with a thumping lie. The *Altmark* was thus able to proceed on her way, but in one of the fiords of South Norway she was caught by a British destroyer whose crew rescued the prisoners.

When, as in the case of the *City of Flint*, the Norwegian Government took permissible action to defend Norway's neutrality, the German Government answered with menaces, and when the Norwegian Government lodged protests against the sinking of unarmed Norwegian merchantmen by German submarines the German Government made no answer.

During the first seven months of this war, in which Norway succeeded in maintaining her neutrality, no fewer than 54 of her merchantmen were sent to the bottom by German mines or German submarines, and 600 seamen and passengers lost their lives. The total shipping loss to Norway in those seven months amounted to 120,000 tons. Once again it was the Norwegian mercantile marine which was most exposed to the ruthless warfare of the German Navy. Incidentally, the reason for the reckless sinking of Norwegian ships is not entirely connected with the war, as an article of Helfferich in the *National-Zeitung* printed in January 1941 clearly indicates. This article bemoans the decline of Hamburg and Bremen as world ports. Since the First World War Denmark, Norway and Sweden had developed their own merchant shipping fleets and refrained from using Hamburg as transit harbour. It was now Germany's task to restore the conditions which existed before 1914. The Norwegians, Swedes and Danes would have to withdraw from certain freight markets in order that Hamburg might once again become the transit port of Northern Europe.

Here lies the one reason for the wholesale sinkings of Norwegian shipping. The Norwegian mercantile marine occupies fourth place in the world. It is a dangerous competitor of Germany's merchant fleet. It must disappear from the high seas and make way for the Germans.

4. THE RUSSO-FINNISH WAR.

The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40 favoured a course of development in Finland which was very favourable to Germany's plans. It dragged Finland into an armed conflict and made an end of her neutrality, and at least it strengthened the position of the Finnish Right-Wing extremists and nationalists. With the strengthening of the Finnish Right Wing and the corresponding weakening of the Finnish Left Wing Germany's chances of securing Finland as a willing ally became a certainty. Sooner or later the tendency towards an open alliance between Finland and Germany would gain the upper hand. In that case Finland's attitude towards Germany's subsequent plans in the north would be clarified, and Germany could rely absolutely on her support.

No arrangements had been made between the Scandinavian

countries for any mutual assistance on the military field, and no military assistance had been promised. In consequence Finland received none from Norway or from any other Scandinavian State. In any case, quite apart from the fact that to have granted such assistance would have meant the abandonment of neutrality, none of the Scandinavian States was in a position to grant assistance to an extent which would have made any real difference to the upshot of the war.

However, the sympathies of the Norwegian people, including the Norwegian workers, were clearly with Finland, and in a very few months large sums of money were collected to help the Finns, and ambulances, first-aid and hospital equipment, clothes, food-stuffs, etc., were sent to Finland in large quantities. In addition, many hundreds of Finnish refugees were welcomed with the warmest hospitality on Norwegian territory.

Now, although the German Government had no desire to see an out-and-out Russian victory over the Finns, it threatened both Norway and Sweden with dire consequences if they continued to send material assistance to Finland. Germany was anxious that the war should have the effect of withdrawing Finland from the circle of Scandinavian co-operation altogether, and she therefore did her best to see to it that every practical proof of Scandinavian solidarity was prevented. When Great Britain and France were considering the despatch of troops and war materials to Finland to assist the Finns, Germany made it quite clear that she would regard the transport of such troops and war materials over either Norwegian or Swedish territory as an act of war to be answered with belligerent measures. When Great Britain and France requested permission for the transport of troops and war materials over Norwegian territory, the war had already entered into its final stage, and Norway's refusal to permit the use of her territory for such purposes made no difference whatever to the final upshot. Things worked out very well for Germany's plans. The Finns received the peace Germany had hoped for and they were driven into her arms.

At the beginning of 1940, shortly before the German attack on Norway, a list of sins allegedly committed by the Scandinavian States against their obligation of strict neutrality were summed up in *Geist der Zeit*, the organ of the German Academic Exchange Service:

"They were constantly stressing their firm determination to maintain strict neutrality, but they took part in the imposition of sanctions against Italy; they tolerated a far from neutral attitude on the part of public opinion in their countries during the Spanish civil war; they permitted a most un-neutral attitude to be adopted towards Germany in the September crisis in 1938; they took part officially in each instance of un-neutral

activity on the part of the League of Nations; and they readily let themselves be drawn along in the wake of British foreign policy, partly because they were fond of British pounds, partly because they saw that Great Britain was organizing resistance to National Socialist Germany, which they do not like because its struggle for the right of 80 million German people to live disturbed them in the peaceful digestion of their rich northern banquet, and, finally, partly because they were deceived by the British siren-song praising the solidarity of the 'Democracies', and assuring them of British assistance in case of need (see Poland!) The northern neutrality politicians let themselves be tempted on to thin ice much too readily by their British friends. The idea of a solid northern neutrality bloc, which was correct and admirable in itself and calculated to stabilize Europe, developed into a hypocritical shopkeeper's neutrality, unwilling to risk damaging profitable business with either party, but nevertheless leaning dangerously towards the one side and ignoring numerous opportunities of furthering and improving relations with the nearest great neighbourly Power in a way which would certainly not have endangered neutrality."

When Russia and Finland signed the treaty of peace on March 12, 1940, the invasion fleet was already assembled in the harbours of Bremen, Cuxhaven, Hamburg, Flensburg and Kiel awaiting the order to sail against Norway and Denmark. This concocted list of offences against neutrality allegedly committed by the Scandinavian States was intended as the moral justification for the crime Germany was preparing to commit.

IX. NORWAY IN THE GRIP OF NAZI GERMANY

1. THE ASSAULT IN THE NIGHT.

Although Nazi Germany certainly uttered threats against Norway from time to time, there was no carefully prepared and well-organized Press campaign of hysteria against her such as had been launched against Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland prior to the German attacks. Further, no diplomatic steps had been taken to apprise the Norwegian Government in any way of what Germany planned, and only after the launching of the attack was it possible to see in its true perspective an incident which took place four days before April 9. Let Norway's former Foreign Minister Koht describe it:

"The Germans themselves gave a kind of warning in the way peculiar to them. On the night of Friday, April 5, the German Minister in Oslo, Dr. Curt Brauer, invited a body of distinguished

guests, including members of the Government, to come to the German Legation and see a new German film. The guests who accepted the invitation were fairly horrified. The film was a representation of the conquest of Poland, culminating with gruesome pictures of the bombing of Warsaw accompanied by the text: 'For this they had to thank their English and French friends.' Undoubtedly it was intended to show the Norwegians what would be the result of resisting Germany."*

Germany did not request Norway to grant any demands and she gave her no warning whatever, and when hostilities began they were, of course, not preceded by any formal declaration of war. The invasion was planned as a stab in the dark and its preparations were carried out with the utmost secrecy. Seamen from Bremen and Hamburg told the author that one day towards the end of March when they boarded their ships they were ordered not to go on shore again. They were not even given an opportunity of getting in touch with their relatives. Their ships, which were engaged in the normal trade between Germany and Norway, were then loaded with arms, munitions, equipment and foodstuffs, and outwardly camouflaged as colliers. The crews were strengthened, and the ships left harbour towards the end of March. The seamen had been given no indication of what was afoot and of the action in which they were to take part.

However, with all their preparations the German invasion of Norway was very far from being a walk-over. Although the Norwegian people were quite unprepared for anything of the sort their resistance developed into a campaign which lasted sixty-three days and proved very costly for the invaders. Officially, of course, the Germans made light of their losses, and declared that their casualty list was only 3,687 dead. Their naval losses were put at 3 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 1 torpedo-boat, 6 submarines and 15 smaller vessels. Germany's real losses in the whole action have never been admitted.

The official German communiqué concerning the crime reads as follows: "In order to counter the British attack now in progress against the neutrality of Norway and Denmark the German armed forces have taken over the protection of these States. For this purpose strong German forces entered or landed this morning in both countries. To safeguard these operations extensive minefields have been laid."

The usual lie: the others did it first. Germany is innocent of all guilt. This perfidy was repeated by the German Foreign Minister and then found its way into the German White Book on Norway. The truth is, as we have already clearly seen, that Norway was

* H. Koht, former Foreign Minister of Norway, *Norway Neutral and Invaded*. (Hutchinson, London, 1941.)

invaded because the strategic offensive plans of the German Admiralty demanded it, and the complete details of the operation were in the Admiralty files long before it was put into execution.

2. GERMAN "CULTURE" FOR THE WEAKER BRETHREN.

The German power strategists had made their preparations down to the last detail, but one thing was wrong in their calculations: they had misjudged the people of Norway. Hordes of Pan-German university professors and other theorists had analysed these "Germanic relatives", found them unmanly and degenerate, found them lost in flabby aestheticism, found them wallowing in base materialism. For 126 years the Norwegian people had had no cause to take up arms, and they were deeply pacifist by nature and inclination. That was perfectly true, but the conclusions drawn by Germany's professorial dolts were utterly false. The Norwegians, they argued, must therefore be cowardly, soft, weak and incapable of defending their freedom and independence.

The German plan of campaign was based on this assumption, and on the fact that Norway's material means of defence were weak and inadequate. They were indeed weak and inadequate; the two boats which put up such a fine show at Narvik were both forty years old! But once again the conclusions the Germans drew from this fact were false. Listen to the German *Marine-Rundschau* in May 1933: "Norway's sea power has to shoulder an immense task of vital importance for the country; it has to protect the fisheries and protect shipping. Her forces are inadequate to guard her territory successfully and they will remain so in the future. How inadequate would they prove if that task had to be carried out against the strongest Powers in the world! As disagreeable as that might be in individual cases, Norway has no other choice than to let things take their course, whilst striving by diplomatic means to ameliorate her position. The maintenance of fishing, coastal shipping and a certain volume of foreign trade is essential to the life of the country. In the event of international conflict Norway will be prepared to make far-reaching concessions to secure this possibility."

In other words, the Germans argued that all they had to do was to face the Norwegian Government with a *fait accompli*, and it would then "let things take their course" and merely try to make the best of it by means of diplomatic action. What actually happened came as a very disagreeable shock to the Germans. The Nygaardsvold Government did not let things take their course, but, on the contrary, it called upon the Norwegian people to resist, and the call met with the united response of the nation. The result was that the invasion plan did not go as smoothly as the Germans had expected. In particular the guise of friend and protector was torn off at once.

Thus after a short and unsuccessful period of "friendship", the occupation authorities had to adopt other measures. "German

rule" was established, and the Gestapo, the military authorities, and under their protection a handful of contemptible Quislings, shared the roles of oppressors, torturers, prison guards and executioners. Democratic rights and liberties established in Norway for centuries were trodden underfoot. Norway had always been a stronghold of civil liberties, and her people had never tolerated serfdom or the tyranny of an aristocratic upper class. With the arrival of the *Herrenvolk* the system of democratic self-administration was destroyed throughout the country, freedom of movement was abolished, political parties were disbanded, and the rights of the trade unions abolished. Thousands of men and women were arrested for their opposition to the occupation authorities and imprisoned or sent to concentration camps. The Germans organized their apparatus of suppression with the thoroughness for which they are notorious. Legal rights and legal security ceased to exist, and the rule of the jack-boot was established instead. As an earnest of what might be expected, two little Norwegian villages, Bulanded and Teelevaag, were subjected to the same fate as the little Czech village of Lidice; they were razed to the ground.

But all these brutalities have not broken the spirit of the Norwegian people. In fact, resistance is growing. Workers, officials, industrialists, merchants, shopkeepers, teachers, judges, clergymen and their bishops, Right-Wing and Left-Wing politicians, the Labour Party and the trade unions, old and young, they are all in one front today, and their slogan is a proud one: "No Norwegian is for sale!"

That is how Germany is holding down Norway. That is how she is protecting the Norwegian people from the horrors of war. That is how she is maintaining law and order. She is sowing the seeds of undying hatred and contempt in the hearts of the Norwegian people.

"Don't ask us what we think of those who have broken into our country and trodden law and justice, liberty and humanity, underfoot. There is no word strong enough to express our hatred, and our contempt for them is even stronger. On the day when we recover our country and our liberties we shall put forward our just demands for the reparation of these crimes. We shall not be able to punish them as they deserve; to do that we should have to descend to their level, and that would be impossible for us, for behind all our passion for justice lies our sense of moral cleanliness. And whatever happens in the first flush of our just rage, we shall quickly gain control of ourselves and act as true Norwegians—even to Germans and Quislings."

They are, once again, the words of Sigrid Undset, the Norwegian poetess.

3. A COLONY IN GERMANY'S "LIVING-SPACE".

Under cover of a regime of terror Norway is being systematically plundered by the Germans. Everything of use as raw materials or otherwise for the prosecution of the war is being seized and sent to Germany. Although the Germans solemnly promised when they entered Norway that they would not take away any foodstuffs, this promise, naturally, has not been kept, and not only have the troops of occupation descended on the countryside like a swarm of locusts, eating up all Norway's food stocks, but great quantities of coffee, butter, oils, tinned food and fish have been seized and sent to Germany. About 300,000 German military and civilian persons are now being fed in a country which had a population of less than three million inhabitants, and all tradesmen have been given strict orders that Germans are to be treated as privileged persons.

Norway's production of ores has been increased by ruthless methods of productive organization intended merely to secure the greatest possible output now without regard for future difficulties. A very simple and convenient method of obtaining the property of Norwegian citizens is by official confiscation. This method is widely used against propertied Jews, and against all those Norwegians who have fled abroad to continue the struggle.

The financial squeezing of the country has been brought to a fine art. Speaking in the House of Commons in March 1941, Mr. Butler declared that the estimated annual cost of the German occupation of Norway amounted to 1,200 million crowns, or about 68 million pounds at the pre-war rate of exchange. This means a burden of about £25 per capita of the population. However, that is not all; in addition the occupied territories are compelled to send Germany a great deal more in goods than they receive from her in return. The Central Clearing Institute in Berlin, which regulates trade with the occupied countries, credits the Norwegian export balance with blocked marks. No guarantee is given, of course, regarding the repayment of these credits either in cash or kind. A secret memorandum drawn up by economic experts in Norway estimates the annual cost of this additional burden at 28 million pounds, so that the total burden per capita of the population of Norway is increased to £35, which is equivalent to 13s. 6d. per week for man, woman and child or 54s. weekly for a family of four. It is calculated, in fact, that the occupation costs the Norwegians about 50 per cent of their total national revenue.

This financial drain is part and parcel of the plan to make Norway part of Germany's "living-space". The theories about the New Order which Hitler is to establish all over the world vary in many details, but in one respect they are unanimous—namely, that all the countries of Europe must be economically and politically subject to the Greater German Reich. This applies fully to Norway, of course, and in October 1940 the *Deutsche Schiffahrts-Zeitschrift* published an article in which it declared that Norway's relation to

Germany must become what it was at the time of the Hanseatic League. What that was we have already seen, but to believe the *Deutsche Schiffahrts-Zeitschrift* it was something like the Golden Age, though the foolish Norwegians still fail to see it. In any case, the plain truth is that the Germans are not in the least interested in Norway's well-being, but only in their own; for them Norway is merely an instrument with which they can build up the strength of the German Reich.

This debasement of Norway to the status of a German colony is being carried out as rapidly as possible. Not only is it prohibited to make investments in any but the war industries, but everything is being done to throttle all other industries. Apart from the prohibition of capital investment in branches of industry in whose production Germany is not interested, all maintenance and repair work is being reduced almost to nothing. As the Germans take all the raw materials, etc., they require, and as there is no longer any import of such materials, there has been a terrible shortage for a long time now. The result is that factories which need such raw materials are going to rack and ruin, and the State railways are wearing out for want of proper maintenance. Tree-felling on an unprecedented scale is now going on in Norway's forests. The Germans are not interested in scientific methods except for the mere production of timber, and they are not bothering their heads about replacements for future generations. Work on a great steel works in the north has been stopped by the Germans; they have no desire to see Norway working her own ores.

X. THAT WAS WHY

1. THE GAP IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE PLAN.

German soldiery now trample on Norwegian territory from the south to the North Cape. But have Germany's imperialist objectives been achieved? They have not. Although the Germans hold the Norwegian coastline their navy has not succeeded in its next leap to the Faroes, or Iceland, not to mention the Shetlands. All those strategic positions are still far away from their grip, and as long as they remain so the Germans cannot force open the much-desired "Gateway to the Atlantic".

The seizure of Norway and the occupation of the whole of her territory has not broken the British blockade. Only rarely does a German ship venture out on to the high seas. And if it does succeed in slipping through the first meshes of the blockade it is usually caught in the seas beyond and sent to the bottom of the ocean like the unsinkable *Bismarck*. Although the Norwegian harbours of Stavanger, Bergen, Trondhjem, Narvik and Tromsø have been developed into powerful naval bases the German fleet

is still a prisoner. In fact German ships do not feel really safe even there, and they much prefer to be behind Heligoland or in the Baltic.

Germany's military leaders reckoned that fifteen years of careful preparation at a time when other nations were not preparing would suffice to give them an overwhelming advantage, and that their enormous *Luftwaffe* would make victory short and swift. They failed to reckon with the obstinate resistance of Great Britain and her allies, or to imagine that these countries would ever be in a position to build an air fleet as strong as, if not stronger than, the *Luftwaffe*, and thus alter the course of the war. However, these are facts clear for everyone to see, and they have made a difference to the importance of Norway in Germany's strategic offensive plans.

Germany's naval strategists believed that the possession of the Norwegian coastline would be decisive for a German victory in the war they were preparing. Today it is already certain that the possession of the coastline and its harbours, and the possession of the whole country, will not prevent a German defeat. All Germany's plans for world conquest are being foiled, and the regime of terrorism which the Germans have instituted in Norway will make it worse for Germany when the time comes.

Norway will rise again!

2. WHY NORWAY?

"The occasion for war can be found as soon as the moment is considered favourable for the prosecution of hostilities," declared Bismarck when he was preparing the Prussian war against Denmark in 1863. The German Government has presented the world with a poor copy of Bismarck's methods. The Nazis did not want war with Norway; all they wanted was to seize "the Norwegian strategic position" without war, and for this reason they prepared the blow treacherously and in the greatest secrecy in order that when it did fall it would do so with overwhelming strength and suddenness. The exultant communiqué of the German military authorities told the world why Norway had been invaded: "The campaign in Norway has broken the British blockade front. Greater Germany is now in possession of the strategically important flanking position facing the eastern coast of England."

That was why Norway's neutrality was violated and her territory occupied.

At the beginning of 1940 the Germans realized that they could no longer reckon with a cheap victory. They had begun war to fulfil their dreams of a Greater Germany. Her strategic offensive plan demanded that the German fleet should emerge from the south of the North Sea, break the British blockade and keep open the entrance to the Baltic. The neutral States of the north were much weaker militarily than the neutrals of the west. Belgium and Holland were never so disarmed as Norway and Denmark, and in

the last few years before the outbreak of war they had begun to strengthen their defences rapidly. The attempt to break the blockade had to be made from the north, and for that the possession of the Norwegian coast was essential.

That was why Norway's neutrality was violated and her territory occupied.

With the occupation of Norway Germany secured control of all Norway's coastal shipping and in particular she made certain of her shipments of Swedish ore via Narvik.

That was why Norway's neutrality was violated and her territory occupied.

At the same time the occupation of Norway represented a dangerous threat to the east coast of England, and a warning to Russia. Russia was still a partner to the non-aggression pact with Germany at the time, but the plans for launching an attack on her were already worked out. Speaking in May 1942, the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano declared that the decision to attack Russia had been made a year before the attack was actually launched. In the event of war between Germany and Russia Germany's possession of North Norway was of great importance because it threatened Russia's north-west flank and at the same time made it more difficult for Great Britain to send assistance to Russia over the Arctic route. In addition, the possession of the Norwegian coastline gave German favourable submarine bases for attacks on both British and Russian shipping.

That was why Norway's neutrality was violated and her territory occupied.

Germany was also interested in destroying the economic co-operation between Norway and Great Britain. Great Britain imported about 40 per cent of her iron ore through Norway, and the British steel industry was used to dealing with Norwegian ores. She also obtained certain highly-important ferro-alloys indispensable for the hardening of steel. In addition, about 50 per cent of her imports of ferro-manganese and over 80 per cent of her imports of molybdenum came from Norway. Then there was the great volume of timber, wood-pulp and newsprint imports. And finally, Great Britain imported valuable acetylene products used in shipbuilding, and the production of synthetic rubber and petrol. Germany was anxious to cut off these important exports to Great Britain.

That was why Norway's neutrality was violated and her territory occupied.

The aims of German imperialist expansion were far-flung, and long and careful preparations were made to bring about their fulfilment. The significance of Norway as an economic auxiliary to Germany in the event of war was not overlooked. The catches from the richest fishing-grounds in the world would make Germany's food situation easier. Norway had also become indispensable to

Germany as a provider of ores and other metals. However, the Germans were unable to persuade Norway to abandon her neutrality either by agreement or alliance, and neither promises nor threats were sufficient to move her.

That was why Norway's neutrality was violated and her territory occupied.

The Kaiser was angry at being compelled to respect the neutrality of the Scandinavian States; why should the Nazis bother their heads with such scruples? After all, Norway was a stronghold of democracy, and her people were devoted to the ideal of individual liberty and to the principles of humanity and justice. They had taken their part in international efforts to set up a system of security to protect all nations great and small, and if her efforts had been successful Germany's own plans of imperialist expansion would have been foiled. The German leaders were unwilling to tolerate such interference with their plans for a new world order based on German hegemony.

That was why Norway's neutrality was violated and her territory occupied.

At the time of the first wars of the German League against Denmark in 1848-49 and in 1863-64 Norway still lay outside Germany's sphere of interest. However, with the proclamation of Germany as the strongest Naval Power after Great Britain at the beginning of the present century, with the development of the all-devouring plans of the Pan-Germans, and with the increased importance of the North Sea for world trade, Norway was dragged into the danger zone. German aggression, German imperialist expansion, and the lust for world conquest still deeply rooted in the German people brought about the Second World War as it had brought about the First. The development of the technique of war at sea and in the air, the reckless lack of all scruples demonstrated by the German Government, the violation of solemn promises and the tearing-up of solemn agreements, plunged the peaceable peoples of the north into war.

That was the nature of those German "interests" which impelled the German Government to violate Norwegian neutrality, to cause the occupation of Norwegian territory by its own *Herrenvolk* and to cast the free people of Norway into a tyrannical slavery.

That was "Why Norway?"!

THE END

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